Nova Southeastern University

NSUWorks
Faculty Scholarship

Shepard Broad College of Law

Summer 1-1-2003

Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy & Ethics
Jon M. Garon

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles

Recommended Citation
Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy & Ethics, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 101 (2003).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Shepard Broad College of Law at NSUWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

CORNELL
LAW REVIEW
Volume 88

July 2003

Number 5

ARTICLES
UNIDIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM:
POWER AND PERSPECTIVE IN

COMMERCE CLAUSE ADJUDICATION .........

NORMATIVE COPYRIGHT:

A

Robert A. Schapiro 1199
& William W Buzbee

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Jon M. Garon 1278

FOR COPYRIGHT PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS .......
HARMONIZING SUBSTANTIVE-CRIMINAL-LAW
.VALUES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
THE CASE OF ALFORiD AND

Stephanos Bibas 1361

NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS ...................
STRAINING AT GNATS AND SWALLOWING CAMELS:

THE SELECTIVE MORALITY OF

Albert W Alschuler

PROFESSOR BIBAS .........................

1412

BRINGING MORAL VALUES INTO A

FLAWED PLEA-BARGAINING SYSTEM ............

Stephanos Bibas 1425

NOTES
HANGING BY YARNS?: DEFICIENCIES IN ANECDOTAL
EVIDENCE THREATEN THE SURVIVAL OF
RACE-BASED PREFERENCE PROGRAMS

FOR PUBLIC CONTRACTING .................

Jeffrey M. Hanson 1433

STRUCTURING THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO
SEARCH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

FOR BRADY MATERIA1 ......................

Mark D. Villaverde 1471

NORMATIVE COPYRIGHT: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR COPYRIGHT PHILOSOPHY
AND ETHICS
Jon M. Garont
This Article explores the theoretical underpinnings of copyright to determine which theories provide an appropriatebasis for copyright. The Article
first critiques the leading conceptual underpinnings, including naturallaw,
copyright's intangible nature, economic balancing and copyright's role in
creatingincentivesfor new authorship. The Article then addresses each of the
three core elements in normative justice-the social contract, the legal rules,
and the mechanisms of enforcement-to develop a schema for reestablishing
a normatively valid copyright policy.
The research presented demonstrates that the intangible nature of copyright does not govern the public's attitude toward copyright. Instead, norms
associated with plagiarism illustrate society's ability to accept intangible
property rules, while comparison with shoplifting indicates a strong corollary
to piracy involvingphysical goods. Similarly, the naturalrights approach to
copyright used in Europe, while a sound basisfor copyright protection, provides no additionalguidance on how copyright policy should develop.
The Article endorses the constitutionalincentive of copyright to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts. The Article rejects a modern, narrow, economic interpretationof this mandate and instead endorses the approach consistently articulatedby the Supreme Court since Baker v. Selden
in 1879, that expression is protected so that authors will develop new facts
and ideas for the betterment of the public. The Article concludes by illustrating the consequence of this construction on issues involving the promotion of
authorship, while highlighting needed expansion of fair use, protection of
reverse engineering,limitations on clickwrap agreements, and cautious constraints on peer-to-peerfile sharing.
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The speaker pointed out to the [law] students their moral obtuseness in
failing to appreciate that the one activity zvas equivalent to the other.'
INTRODUCTION

"Thou shalt not steal" 2 is an axiomatic rule of both law and morality for all societies. Nonetheless, over 200 million users have
downloaded peer-to-peer file sharing software, 3 despite the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Napster and similar services constitute theft rather
than fair use. The unauthorized downloading of MP3 files is just a
small part of the larger problem.
The numbers are sometimes overwhelming. "In 2001, the United
States suffered a staggering 111,000 job losses, $5.6 billion in lost
4
wages and $1.5 billion in lost tax revenue due to pirated software."
The motion picture industry estimates an additional $3 billion in lost
revenue annually as of 2000. 5 Add to this an additional $3 billion in
the video game industry, and a five percent decline in music saleswhich may be worth an additional $4 billion-and the numbers start
6
adding up.
These figures help illustrate the magnitude of the problem. The
public does not appear to equate the moral imperative against stealing with the unauthorized downloading of music or piracy of software.
Despite statutory authority prohibiting copyright violation, 7 and supporting case law, the perception is that no law has been violated, or if
it has that the infraction was a mere technicality. Or it may be that the
Internet remains an essentially unregulated back alley where traditional notions of law, ethics, and justice have yet to take root.
I
MAYIrER

2

David Nimmer, Thou Shalt Not Steal: A Canon of Construction of Title 17?, 27 NEw

23, 24 (2002).
Exodus 20:15. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 24 (commenting on the different num-

bering systems between the Jewish and Catholic versions of the Ten Commandments).
3 According to the home of KaZaA, the leading source of peer-to-peer software,
"fo]ver 214 million Kazaa Media Desktops downloaded so far... [.] Over 3.2 million
downloaded last week." KaZaA, at http://kazaa.com/us/index.php (last visited Apr. 20,

2003).
4 Bus. Software Alliance, Software Piracy and the Law: Information on Software Piracy in
the United States, at http://www.bsa.org/isa/antipiracy/law/PiracyLawO3.pdf (last visited
Apr. 20, 2003).
5 See Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Anti-Piracy, at http://mpaa.org/anti-piracy (last
visited Apr. 20, 2003).
6 See Kathryn Balint, Quite a Reach: The Battle over Control of Copyrighted Materialon the
Internet Includes Worksftom the Common to the Arcane, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 8, 2002, at

El.
7 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 506 (2000).
8 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D.

Wash. 2000).
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Indeed, the very nature of the Web is what makes it such a playground for hoodlums ....
Fraudsters can tap into an international
audience from anyplace in the world and-thanks to the Net's anonymity-hide their activities for months, years, forever....
That has spawned a bustling Underground Web that's growing
at an alarming rate. Black-market activity conducted online will
reach an estimated $36.5 billion this year-about the same as the
$39.3 billion U.S. consumers will spend on the legitimate Internet
9
this year, according to researcher comScore Media Metrix.
An explanation for the incongruity of the public's perception of
right and wrong on the Internet has yet to be fully documented. Anonymity, lack of legal consequences, and fewer social constraints may
all play a part.' 0 For intellectual property more generally, and copyrighted works in particular, this perception may stem from our underlying notions of property and the uneasy coexistence between the
tangible and intangible within traditional property schemes. Taking a
can from a soda machine is theft because the can has been removed
from the machine. Conversely, listening to a jukebox without paying
for the privilege leaves the jukebox intact. Closely aligned with the
corporeal nature of copyrighted works is the philosophical nature of
the property interest most generally associated with the natural rights
of an author to own that which he or she creates.
Furthermore, the moral ambivalence towards copyrighted works
may stem from a distrust of the basis for copyright protection. If the
sole basis for protecting copyright is the economic incentive to create,
then as soon as a work is minimally compensated, it should fall into
the public domain. Emphasis on the incentive theory may weaken the
legitimacy of copyright holders' claims.
A third rationalization for violating copyright may stem from the
sense that copyright should serve as a shield, but never a sword; it
should protect authors and artists, but not be used against the creative
community to limit creative authorship. Within this framework, those
who decry the erosion of the public domain, those who value reverse
engineering, and those who fear an expansion of contract law to supplant copyright coalesce around the concern that copyright has become inherently onerous and by extension dangerous, rather than a
concern that the proper balance must be restored. Perhaps one of
the most troubling aspects of fair use is that it is often used to separate
permissible borrowing from infringement within this category.'
The fourth significant norm limiting copyright adherence flows
from the industrial use of the copyrighted work, rather than the copy9
10
I

Ira Sager et al., The Underground Web, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 2002, at 67-68.
See id.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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right itself. Many consumers who would never "steal" from the object
of adulation feel that the record or movie business is exploiting their
icon's work. They may rationalize that "the rich record labels, uncaring publishers, and multinational mega-corporations are getting rich
unfairly and will never miss my money or are impotent to stop me
from taking what I want." This rationalization supports everything
from the home taping validated by Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,' 2 to peer-to-peer file sharing,"' to educators who are
unwilling to conduct copyright clearance for their student course
packs.
The combination of copyright's intangible nature, an accepted
norm rejecting corporate greed, the perception that copyright should
not constrain legitimate unauthorized users, and the overstatement of
copyright's economic reward create a normative culture where theft
of intellectual property is no longer regarded as an illegal, unethical,
or antisocial act. Piracy has been incorporated into the economic culture, buoying the consumer electronic market through the sale and
14
promotion of products that exploit copyright infringing activities.
Only after copyright holders identify the root sources of the cultural
attitudes toward piracy can they begin to fashion a meaningful response. To the extent that the norms reflect flaws within the legal
regime of copyright itself, Congress must address those concerns to
eliminate the erosion of copyright.
Certainly these cultural justifications are not an exclusive list.
Youth needs to rebel and the online community has developed a
counterculture of software piracy motivated by the ability to tweak the
system or break the laws. 15 This youthful rebellion, however, validates
copyright in that the very act of rebellion is futile without something
to rebel against. There is no act of rebellion in taping a football game
16
off the air. Despite the unethically broad warning used by the NFL,
taping a game for private reuse falls well within the accepted fair use
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012, 1016-17.
14
SeeJim Hu, Hollywood Stages Piracy Showdown, ZDNET NEWS, Aug. 7, 2002, at http://
zdnet.com.com/2100l 106-948719.html.
"[O]ne high-tech executive ... described illegal pirate content as a 'killer
application' that will drive consumer demand for broadband," said Eisner,
chief executive of Walt Disney, in testimony before a Senate hearing....
"Unfortunately, other high-tech companies have simply lectured us that
they have no obligation to help solve what they describe as 'our problem.'"
Id.
15 See Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of
Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REv. 11, 11-14 (2002) (describing a number of Internet
attacks by teenagers and others).
16
The scope of suggested prohibition seems significantly broader than the rights
ascribed to the copyright owner. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429; NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
841, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1997).
12

13
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home taping exception authorized under Sony. 1 7 Some copyright violations are pure economic theft motivated by easy money and low
risk.18 But the public's loss of faith in copyright protection threatens
copyright far more than core criminal activity.
Central to the question of copyright ethics, morality, and normative modeling, is the very legitimacy of copyright itself. Unless there is
a valid conceptual basis for copyright laws, there can be no fundamental immorality in refusing to be bound by them. The ethics of the law
must be grounded in fundamental notions of justice and fairness, for
without this, the rules devolve into conveniences which will be obeyed
only when punishment is close at hand. If the only reason to respect
copyright is to avoid being caught, it has outlived its purpose.
The need to conceptualize and articulate the law is hardly novel.
William Blackstone explained the importance of analyzing the basis of
the laws of property:
It is well if the mass of mankind will obey the laws when made, without scrutinizing too nicely into the reason for making them. But,
when law is to be considered not only as a matter of practice, but
also as a rational science, it cannot be improper or useless to examine more deeply the rudiments and grounds of these positive
constitutions of society.19

The rational science of intellectual property law must similarly be
scrutinized to identify and bolster the positive constitutions of society.
As noted Professor Pamela Samuelson has commented,
"[c] opyright should be accounted a great success at modeling author
and reader behavior, for the basic framework of this law has lasted
nearly three hundred years. .

.

. [C]opyright industries have flour-

ished and copyright law has broadened to include a wide variety of
intellectual products besides those manufactured by printing
presses." 20 The achievement to date has been breathtaking.
Nonetheless, if the law-abiding public is to continue to follow
copyright, it will not merely be as a result of existing laws on the
books. Copyright must be rooted in some deeper understanding of
society's regard for creativity, property, economic efficiency, or fundamental justice. The core of copyright's value must be identified, its
central principles articulated, and the public reminded of its self-evident truths. Finally, the many modern ornamentations must be
reevaluated in light of its fundamental purpose.
17

18

Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55.
SeeJoan Anderman, The Music Business: What's Next?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2003,

at N1.
19
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 393 (William
Draper Lewis ed., 1900).
20
Pamela Samuelson & RobertJ. Glushko, Intellectual Property Rights for Digital Library
and Hypertext Publishing Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 238 (1993).
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The normative acceptance of and adherence to the law is essential to its continued viability. If copyright law retains its normative
role-shaping behavior, then the industries that rely on its protection
will succeed. Copyright will not succeed if it relies on punishment to
motivate compliance. The three centuries of success have been
largely built on public acquiescence to the need for copyright payments and rules. If copyright becomes broadly ignored, then the economic, educational, and social models that rely upon copyrighted
works would be forced to change.
This is not merely an acknowledgment that copyright piracy is a
significant cultural as well as economic problem. In both the United
States and abroad, the disregard of copyright's normative role undermines the development of creative artists and communities. As one
commentator put it, "it is particularly detrimental to the cultural life
of developing countries. National production of books, audio-visual
21
works and phonograms can be suffocated at birth."
The shape of copyright, however, is not merely dictated by legal
rules. Society had little need for copyright prior to the general adoption of the printing press, 2 2 and throughout the past four centuries,
most of copyright's growth has been fostered by technological innovation in the creation, production, and distribution of copyrighted
works. 23 Balancing technology and law is the role of social acceptance
and observance of copyright's norms. If the public believed an infringing activity was appropriate, then copyright owners could not afford to fight it on either the financial or political front. 24 Social

acceptance of copyright's legitimacy is as critical to its infrastructure as
are the relevant laws and technology.
The future development of copyright culture will flow from technological innovation, legal constraints, and social norms. Increasingly, however, journalists, analysts, teachers, parents, and others are
beginning to realize that it is neither the technology nor the law at the
center of the controversy, but the ethical and social norms of U.S.
21
JOHN GURNSEY, COPYRIGHT THEFT 30 (1995) (quoting The InternationalCopyright System: The Berne Conventionfor the Protectionof Literary and Artistic Works: Basic Rules and Special
Rules for Developing Countries, I IJ. LImr. & INFO. Sci., INDIA 91-106 (1986).
22
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12. The Court noted that

"[clopyright protection became necessary with the invention of the printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws. The
fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with
freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other."
Id. (quoting B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)).
23
See generallyJon M Garon, Entertainment Law,76 TuL.L. REV.559 (2002) (tracking
the changes to copyright law spurred by the introduction of various media, including theatre, photography, music, and motion pictures).
24
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 446.
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society. Forbes columnist Stephen Manes noted that "the most important issues regarding the protection of intellectual property may not
25
be technological or legal but social."
As copyright issues have moved towards the forefront of popular
culture, trade, and the Supreme Court docket, society has lost sight of
the first principles that should be driving copyright's development.
This Article attempts to return us to those early principles, providing a
solid footing for legislative and public policy debates.
Parts I-III of this Article explore various theoretical underpinnings of copyright to determine which theories provide an appropriate basis for copyright protection. Part I critiques the more recent
approaches to copyright, assessing copyright as both an intangible and
a natural right. Part II reviews the traditional economic and incentivebased rationales for copyright. Part III analyzes the conceptual philosophical framework that shapes the policies underlying copyright.
Part IV builds on the core fundamentals identified in the earlier parts
and suggests some necessary steps to reorient each of the three primary building blocks-social contract, technology, and law-for normative acceptance of copyright.
The outcome of the research indicates that the intangible nature
of copyright does not govern the public's respect-or lack thereoffor copyright. Similarly, the natural rights approach to copyright used
in Europe, while a sound basis for copyright protection, does not provide any guidance on how copyright laws should be drafted. Instead,
this Article returns to the constitutional incentive of copyright which
requires the granting of copyright because it is necessary to promote
progress of science and the useful arts. 26 Rather than interpreting
this in a narrow, economic fashion, however, the more proper balance
to be used is that which the Supreme Court has articulated since Baker
v. Selden 27 in 1879-expression is protected so that authors will develop new facts and ideas for the betterment of the public. The Article concludes by illustrating the consequences of this construction on
issues involving shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements, fair use, reverse engineering, and peer-to-peer file sharing.

25
Stephen Manes, Surfing and Stealing: An Author's Perspective, 23 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &
ARrS 127, 129 (1999).
26
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
27
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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I
THE NORMS OF COPYRIGHT'S LIMITS

Copyright as Property-The Intangible Attributes

A.

To better understand why copyright works or fails as a legal regime, the first step is to analyze that which it seeks to protect. At various times, copyright has been characterized as protecting the property
interests in the author or copyright holder of the work,28 as embodying legal recognition for the fruits of a person's industry, 29 or as providing an economic incentive for a work to be created. 3° Each of
these general approaches may individually or in the aggregate describe the property regime upon which copyright is based. The most
apparent basis, however, is the intangible nature of a copyright.
1.

The Attributes of TraditionalProperty

According to Blackstone, the traditional view of property was not
particularly well defined. Rather, it was simply recognized, first by its
application to land and estates, and only much later as to movable
chattel."' In defining real property, a possessory interest in land requires "a physical relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain
degree of physical control over the land, and an intent so to exercise
such control as to exclude other members of society in general from
any present occupation of the land." 32 These twin attributes, physical

control and the ability to exclude, are the central aspects of the possessory interest in property. Judge Posner introduces property rights
' '3
as the "rights to the exclusive use of valuable resources.
David Nimmer noted that the difference between the tangible
and intangible world may be one of the difficulties inherent in teaching the public the immorality of theft of copyrighted works.314 This
observation encompasses a number of differing issues underlying the
nature of the work. Most fundamentally, something that cannot be
physically felt cannot be physically taken away. This dichotomy provides a simple but insufficient rationalization to explain why otherwise
honest people are willing to steal copyrighted works by purchasing
pirated copies, downloading music and films, and making copies of
software for friends.
28 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
29
See Roger Chartier, Figures of the Author, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON
COPYRICHT" LAw 14 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994).
'1
See Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326.
31
32

BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 385.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 7(a) (1936).

3-'

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 31 (4th ed. 1992)

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS).
314
See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 24.

[hereinafter
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Throughout history, intangibility-based complaints have been

made against copyright. For example, dissenting in 1834, Justice
Thompson raised this common criticism of copyright by explaining
that "it is a well established maxim, that nothing can be an object of
property which has not a corporal substance." 3 5 Justice Yeates, writing
in the eighteenth century, is credited with putting forth the most articulate view of this position:
The property claimed is all ideal; a set of ideas which have no
bounds or marks whatever-nothing that is capable of a visible possession-nothing that can sustain any one of the qualities or incidents of property. Their whole existence is in the mind alone.
Incapable of any other modes of acquisition or enjoyment than by
mental possession or apprehension; safe and invulnerable from
their own immateriality, no trespass can reach them, no tort affect
them; no fraud or violence diminish or damage them. Yet these are
the phantoms which the author would grasp and confine to himself;
and these are what the defendant is charged with having robbed the
plaintiff of.
He asks, can sentiments themselves (apart from the paper on
which they are contained) be taken in execution for a debt; or if the
author commits treason or felony, or is outlawed, can the ideas be
forfeited? Can sentiments be seized; or, by any act whatever be
vested in the crown? If they cannot be seized, the sole right of publishing them cannot be confined to the author. How strange and
singular, says he, must this extraordinary kind of property be,which

cannot be visibly possessed, forfeited or seized, nor is susceptible of
any external injury, nor, consequently, of any specific or possible
3 6

remedy.

Yeates captures the essence of the incorporeal concern, but in
fact many of these issues have been answered. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code specifically provides for securitization of intangible assets, so there is a method of seizing them as necessary to
satisfy a debt.3 7 Although Yeates is correct that ideas are ultimately
incapable of political control or coercion, the expressions in books
declared treasonous can be banned or burned, and it is the expression rather than the idea which gives rise to property rights.
35
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 672-73 (1834) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
The quote was intended to show both the rhetoric and the folly of the position. As the
dissent continued, "this view of [copyright] would hardly deserve a serious notice, had it
not been taken by a distinguished judge." Id. at 673.
36

Id.

See generally Steven 0. Weise, The Financingof Intellectual Property Under Revised UCC
Article 9, 74 CH.-KENT L. Rev. 1077 (1999) (noting that Revised Article 9 covers intellectual
assets, but copyrights may still be subject to federal preemption); see also In re Peregrine
Entm't, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that a creditor with an unperfected interest has lesser priority); in reAvalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1997) (discussing the perfection of a security interest in software).
37
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Unlike Yeates, and despite Nimmer's misgivings, Judge Posner
notes that "the economist experiences no sense of discontinuity in
moving from physical to intellectual property." 38 The need to prevent
non-owners from exploiting the value of the property is closely aligned with the notion that farmers need to protect their crops from
being stolen as they mature in the fields. 39 Arguably, the analogy
breaks down somewhat because the crop is a rivalous or limited resource, while the copyrighted work, like an idea, is nonrivalous in that
it can be shared with an unlimited number of people without diminishing its value to any others who enjoy it. 411
In describing information within the framework of property, Professor Samuelson describes it as "inherently 'leaky"' because it can be
"shared readily by many people through virtually limitless forms of
communication."4 1 The same can be said today of copyrighted works
passing along a peer-to-peer communications network (first popularized by Napster), or downloaded from bulletin boards and websites.
Nonetheless, copyrighted works, and as Samuelson points out, even
information, may satisfy three primary attributes of property: the right
to exclude others, the right to transfer the property, and the right to
42
possess, use, and enjoy the property.
If property is any thing, whether tangible or intangible, that has
these basic attributes, then copyright fits nicely into the framework.
This should not be particularly surprising. Many of the traditional
property interests do not include physical or present possession and
are therefore intangible. 43 The twin attributes of possession and the
right to exclude identified by the Restatement of Property do not define all property interests, only those that are possessory. Property "estates" may include reversions, remainders, executory interests, powers
of termination, and possibilities of reverter, all of which may or may
not become possessory, but all are unquestionably property interests. 44 Such interests are rivalous, because the rights vested in one
person divest or displace other interests. Each such interest is exclu38

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,

supra note 33, at 38.

See id. at 32-33.
40 In practice, this is less true than theory would indicate. Sneak previews, premieres,
exclusive engagements, and limited releases are all business practices which suggest that
limiting the size of the audience enhances the work's value to those who participate. The
corollary is the concept that a work can be "overexposed" to an audience, removing all
scarcity and thereby diluting or destroying its value to the audience.
41
Pamela Samuelson, Infonnation as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a
ChangingDirection in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 369 (1989).
42
See id. at 370 (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 39-41 (3d ed. 1986)).
43
BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 163 ("Estates ... may either be in possession, or in
expectancy: and of expectancies there are two sorts; one created by the act of the parties,
called a remainder; the other by act of law, and called a reversion.") (emphasis omitted).
44
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 9 cmt. b (1936).
39
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sive to the holder, even if the present existence of a different possessor of the physical property limits its enjoyment. Thus the notion that
the intangible nature of the intellectual property makes it a sui generis
creature of property law is inapt.4 5 While intellectual property may

have attributes unique among the categories of property, its intangible nature is not one of them.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that intellectual property's intangible nature does not distinguish it from real property or from the economic basis of property, consumers may still infer value or legitimacy
from this quality. As one commentator put it, "I would suggest that
there's been a historical presumption that software-and by software I
mean everything from computer programs to radio programs, from
stock quotes to Stephen King novels-is something that, because of its
intangible nature, should be cheap or free.

'46

This possibility cannot be definitively refuted and some consumers may believe that it is true. As described below, however, this concept is more likely conflated with the public goods proposition that
unauthorized copying only has an indirect impact on the copyright
owner's ability to continue exploiting her own rights. 4 7 It is not that

the property is intangible, but that the copyright holder does not have
4
the ability to exclude others.
The assumption is that many of the participants do not accept
their actions as stealing because they have "taken nothing" or more
accurately, they have not prevented others from still obtaining something. Thomas Jefferson expressed this approach early in the development of U.S. copyright policy:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps
it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the
possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself
of it .... He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
45
See I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog Works
and Their Comparisonfor Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 211, 215 (2001).
46
Manes, supra note 25, at 129.
47
See infta Part I.A.2. For an informative statement on the "Right to Copy," see Ram
Samudrala, A Primeron the Ethics of "IntellectualProperty,"at http://www.ram.org/ramblings/
philosophy/fmp/copying__primer.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2003) ("Arbitrary copying, use,
distribution, and modification of published information generally does not cause harm to
anyone.").
48
Hardy, supra note 45, at 222.
[W]ithout the ability to exclude others from obtaining their farm output,
farmers would involuntarily confer external benefits on others, which in
turn would mean that farmers would have too little incentive to produce
crops in the first place, just as authors would have too little incentive to
produce works of authorship.
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himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems
to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature .... 49
Of course, it is easy to limit the impact of Jefferson's statement to
unframed general ideas, and indeed copyright has embraced this distinction. 5 1 The idea-expression dichotomy provides legal protection
only for the copyright, while leaving the ideas as free as Jefferson described. 51 "[C]opyright is limited to those aspects of the worktermed 'expression'-that display the stamp of the author's originality." 52 Expression makes the idea unique, specific, and therefore the
property of its creator. The ideas are free and protected from monopoly. 53 Nonetheless, this distinction arises, at least in part, from the
nature of the property interest one can obtain in the idea one
originates and the expression of that idea one creates. It is the lack of
exclusivity rather than the intangible nature of the idea that makes it
ripe for both replication and loss of control.
2.

Plagiarism:The Other Intangible Interest

To understand copyright's intangible nature it helps to compare
copyright with its conceptual cousin, plagiarism which both share
many of the same attributes. 5 4 "Plagiarism means intentionally taking
the literary property of another without attribution and passing it off
as one's own, having failed to add anything of value to the copied
'5 5
material and having reaped from its use an unearned benefit.
Copyright piracy is the taking of literary property of another, having
failed to add anything of value to the copied material and having
reaped from its use an unearned benefit.5 6 Plagiarism, unlike piracy,
49

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI WRITINGS OF

THOMASJEFFERSON 180-81 (Washington ed. 1854)).

50 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (holding that
the "selection, coordination, and arrangement" of a book of white pages does not meet the
requirements for copyright protection because it does not involve the requisite originality);
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (holding that an author may not claim copyright
protection for the format of a book, but only for the content of the book).
51
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
52 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
53 Id. at 556 (stating that "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression"' (quoting Harper &
Row, 723 F.2d at 203)).
54 See Laurie Stearns, Comment, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism,Process, Property, and the Law,
80 CAL. L. REV. 513, 516 (1992).

55 Id. at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
56 See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (exclusive rights of copyright include the
right to reproduce and distribute).
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is purely intangible, without limitations on expression or reference to
57
the particular tangible copies.

According to admittedly anecdotal reports, plagiarism appears to
have the same attraction to the youth demographic as does the illegal
sharing of copyrighted MP3 files. 58 Donald McCabe, founding presi-

dent of the Center for Academic Integrity at Rutgers University, sug59
gests that "'academic integrity' is fast becoming an oxymoron."
According to McCabe, 74% of high school students surveyed admitted
to cheating on a "big test" and 72% reported cheating on written
work. 60 Even more alarming, while approximately 33% admitted to
systemic cheating, a staggering 97% admitted to some "questionable
activity, like copying someone else's homework or peeking at someone else's test."' '
The Internet provides a premiere environment for the distribution of academic and pseudo-academic material. 62 Like online music
copying and software piracy, academic cheating is easy, anonymous,
and bears few consequences. 63 While the Internet is a favorite source
of plagiarized content, many of the high school students use books
and magazines as well as the Web. 64 It is not the availability of
sources, but the consequences that propel many students. "At some
colleges, students who plagiarize are expelled. But a high school student caught plagiarizing may just get a zero for that particular assignment."65 In addition, the culture of plagiarism reinforces the need
and self-justification for the actions. Since everyone is doing it, students believe that either it is not so bad or that to refuse to cheat is to
put oneself at a disadvantage.

66

The pervasiveness of plagiarism suggests that intangible offenses
are the problem. What remains unclear, however, is whether plagiarism's intangible nature or a continual lowering of ethical standards
causes plagiarism. The impression of educators is that "competition
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "copies" as "material objects ...").
See Brigid Shulte, Student Cheaters Find Plenty of Help on Web, CONCORD
Sept. 14, 2002, at A4.
57
58
59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

MONITOR,

See, e.g., http://www.academictermpapers.com; http://www.cheathouse.com;
http://www.essaytown.com; http://www.fastpapers.com; http://www.lazystudents.com;
http://www.papermasters.com; http://www.papers-online.com; http://www.research-assistance.com; http://www.researchpaper.com; http://www.schoolsucks.com; http://
http://www.007term
http://www.4termpapers.com;
www.termpapers-on-file.com;
papers.com.
63
Shulte, supra note 58, at A4 ("McCabe says, 'I can't tell you how many high school
students say they cheat because others do it and it goes unpunished."').
62

64
65
66

Id.
Id.

Id.
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. wanting to get into the best colleges .

.

. peer

pressure... and a message from parents that you have to be successful
at any cost" cause plagiarism. 67 If these are the causes, then the suggestion that students are unaware of the misconduct seems misplaced.
John Barrie, founder of www.plagiarism.org, comments "[i] t's usually
'the higher achievers who cheat, and not the boneheads." 68
The relationship of such behavior to Napster and the Internet is
not lost on these students. "'It's sort of like Napster,' said Joseph
Huffman, 22, a graduate student at the University at Buffalo. 'The
general attitude is, if you see something on the Net, it's not so much
that you own it, but it's there for you to use."' 6 9 These admittedly
anecdotal comments suggest the problem is not the intangible nature
of the interest, but rather the ease with which the theft can occur.
Unfortunately, other anecdotal examples exist. These include
the need to chain pens to counters at banks and grocery stores, theft
of refills at self-serve soda machines, and the more serious threat of
shoplifting. Crimes of theft are common and unrelated to any notion
that the property stolen is intangible. The perception that either file
sharing of copyrighted material or plagiarism is treated differently
than physical theft may be more imagined than real. 70 Shoplifting
and employee theft accounted for ten billion dollars in lost revenue in
2001,71 typically in highly tangible retail goods. 72 This theft is often
committed by teens, 73 the same demographic that has popularized
74
Napster and file sharing.
67 Anthony Violanti, Public vs. PrivateDomain: With the Click of a Mouse, Information Can
Be Borrowed-Even Stolen-off Web Sites. But Do Today's Students Know it's Wrong?, BUFF.
NEWS, June 30, 2002, at El.
68 hI.
69
Id.
70 See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 570 n.10 (2001) ("'There's an incredible disconnect out there between
what is normal behavior in the physical world versus the online world. . . . There are
people who think nothing of downloading entire CD collections on Napster who wouldn't
dream of shoplifting from Tower Records."') (quoting Amy Harmon, Potent Software Escalates Music Industry'sJitters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at Al).
71
Cara Nissman, Sticky Fingers:Host of Causes Spur Spike in Shoplifting, BOSTON HERALD,
May 20, 2002, at 31.
72 See Zalud Report: Outsiders, Insiders and Theft, SECURITY, July-Aug. 2002, at 62. ("For
example, just 30 U.S. retail companies lost over $5 billion to shoplifting and employee
theft ...

[in 2001].").

Nissman, supra note 71, at 31 ("U.S. retailers lost more than $10 billion last year to
shoplifters, 38 percent of whom were teenagers, according to the 2001 National Retail
Security Survey. With the sour economy and kids' increasing desire to compete with their
peers, thieves are becoming younger and younger.").
74
Erik Lacitis, Technology Sparks a College "Copying" Problem, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 29,
2002, at DI ("Millions of people-let's be accurate, most of them teens and college kids[have used] Napster.").
73
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This does not suggest that consumers are more likely to shoplift
than to download software, merely that the categorical distinctions
may be overstated. Nimmer's experiment with his class of law students reflects this reality. 75 What the survey does not capture, how-

ever, are the underlying reasons that plagiarism, music file sharing,
and unauthorized copying may be more generally accepted than
other forms of theft.
Comparing copyright piracy to plagiarism, shoplifting, and other
crimes suggests that copyright piracy is not categorically different.
Like plagiarism and shoplifting, copyright piracy offers ubiquitous opportunities to commit the act, a low risk of being caught, minimal,
infrequent punishment, and the social phenomena that large numbers of individuals are committing similar acts. The physical nature of
the property stolen does not materially alter these factors.
Nor is copyright conceptually different from other forms of property. Real property includes both tangible fees and intangible estates. 76 The economic basis of property does not rely on any tangible
measure. Finally, legal regimes involving intangible property such as
plagiarism remain widely recognized despite the lack of a tangible nature. 77 These other legal doctrines strongly suggest that the intangible nature of the property may be overstated as a meaningful
distinction and has little to do with the public's conduct. Although
the intangible nature of the interest plays a role, it is minor or tangential, rather than the central framework of the philosophical and ethical debate.
B.

The Moral Touchstone of Natural Rights

If the intangible nature of intellectual property does not provide
significant insight into copyright's normative acceptance, then perhaps the philosophical nature of the legal protection will provide
some guidance. Copyright law finds its basis in one of two discrete
philosophies: the natural rights inherent in the law or the economic
rights recognized by statute. 7 Each of these alternative theories (or
their combination) provides the philosophical framework for copyright protection. By extension, the limits of each theory may explain
75 See Nimmer, supra note 1. I have asked a similar question in each semester of my
Copyright Law and Entertainment Law classes. At the height of Napster's popularity, virtually every student in each of my classes was aware of Napster and the significant majority
had used it. With Napster's demise, the usage among my students of other file sharing
programs has dropped to less than one-third. See infra Part IV for discussion of the possible cause of this drop in usage.
76
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
78 See RiCHARD WATr, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY 20-21 (2000).
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the limits of copyright protection, both as a matter of positive law and
as a normative guide for social conduct.
In his thoughtful review of the subject, Professor Fred Yen develops the Lockean nature of property interest and its impact on intellectual property from the early Roman development of natural law. 79 At
its inception, Roman law provided a simple axiom of ownership:
"'Natural reason admits the title of the first occupant to that which
previously had no owner.' "80 From this basis of first occupation developed the notion that the occupier of land was the owner of that land.
That which could not be occupied, such as running water, sea and air,
was not subject to ownership.8
Seventeenth-century Europe was a somewhat different place than
either ancient Rome or the burgeoning American colonies. In worlds
of continuing political expansion, the notion that occupancy could
result in real property ownership held out some hope that property
ownership would expand.8 2 In Europe, however, the idea of physical
expansion was remote and the law of occupancy became more of a
rationalization for upholding the feudal legal system than an inherent
natural law.8 3 Against this political backdrop, Locke's philosophy of
property stands for a sweeping reexamination of man and
84
government.
79
See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 517, 522 (1990).
80
/d. Roman law's natural law tradition was not aspirational, but instead attempted to

reflect the laws of nature as generally known, for codification. See id.
81 Id. at 522-23.
For example, the doctrine of res communes held that "the following things
are by natural law common to all-the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the sea-shore." Similarly, tinder the doctrine of ferae naturae,wild
animals were inherently free, and were considered property only so long as
the owner maintained actual physical possession. If a wild animal escaped,
it regained its inherent liberty.
Id. (citations omitted).
82
In both instances, the preexisting property ownership of the indigenous people was
excluded from these notions of ownership. Neither the peoples of the Ancient World nor
the American Indians were considered to be rightful landowners who could stand on their

rights of primacy in physical ownership. SeeJOHN
bk. II §§ 36-37 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988); JEREMY

LOCKE,

Two

TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

WALDRON, THE

RiGHT

TO PRIVATE PROP-

ERTY 171 (1988).
83
Cf BLACESTONE, supra note 19, at 44-53 (reviewing the origins of the feudal system

from its basis of military expansion to that of a legal fiction which granted the king ownership of all lands).
84
See LOCKE, supra note 82, bk. II §§ 2-3. It may be of some note that the difficulties
in creating the published version of the original book coincide with the collapse of the
printer's monopoly and the enactment of the Statute of Anne. Locke was unhappy with all
the published versions created during his lifetime and that the work which created the
definitive version was completed prior to his death in 1704, but not published until 1713,
three years after the Statute of Anne vested copyright protection in the author for the first
time. See generally id. bk. II §§ 10-11 (introduction by Peter Laslett).
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The Lockean Framework: Labor as the Basis of Property Ownership

Locke's central thesis challenges Robert Filmer's 1680 work, Patriarcha,and its notion of divine government,8 5 by bestowing liberty on
the people instead.8 6 Because the core of Locke's First Treatise focused on refuting Filmer's misuse of the Old Testament for justifying
monarchy and slavery,8 7 Locke developed his theories of property and
individual autonomy only in the Second Treatise.
Locke disclaims a divine right as an introduction to his theory of
property, basing it instead on general principles of mankind's interest.88 Locke starts with the proposition that property ownership must
originate with that which separates the property from its natural state,
so that the fruits which grow untended and the animals hunted in the
wild give no right to any person of ownership. 9
In response to Filmer's divine rights approach to property and to
distinguish owned property from that which exists in nature, Locke
developed his famous statement on property:
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has
any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of
his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he
hath mixed his Labour with, andjoyned [sic] to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of
other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of
the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once
joyned [sic] to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others.9 0

From this statement, it is a short step to infer that the same respect for labor would value not only the agrarian life of wheat, corn,
and berries, but also the intellectual fruit that Locke himself valued as
a published author. But it was others who extended the notion of
See id. bk. I § 1.
See id. bk. I §§ 1-3.
See id. bk. I §§ 1-169.
88 See id. bk. 11 § 25.
That if it be difficult to make out Property, upon a supposition, that God
gave the World to Adam and his Posterity in common; it is impossible that
any Man, but one universal Monarch, should have any Property, upon a
supposition, that God gave the World to Adam, and his Heirs in Succession,
exclusive of all the rest of his Posterity. But I shall endeavor to shew, [sic]
how Men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God
gave to Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact of all
the Commoners.
Id. (italics omitted).
89 See id. bk. II § 26.
90 Id. bk. II § 27 (italics omitted).
85

86
87
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labor-derived ownership to writings. By 1725, the booksellers' and
printers' association in Paris endorsed and expanded Locke's
theme. 9 1 In their report, the Parisian booksellers urged that "the
work produced by an author is 'the fruit of a labour that is personal to
him, which he must have the liberty to dispose of at

will."'

92

This

natural right matured into full legal debate over the rights of an author separate and distinct from the statutory, economic rights provided under the Statute of Anne. 9 3 As the American Revolution
neared, the natural rights approach to copyright had reached its
zenith in England. "'Labour gives a man a natural right of property
in that which he produces[.] [L]iterary compositions are the effect of
labour; authors have therefore a natural right of property in their
works.'"94

The statement that an author's labor created a natural right in
the property of her works, however, begs the question rather than answers it. Were this the property interest as described by Locke, restrictions would necessarily be implicit in such an axiom. The nature of
Locke's system assumed continuing labor as the limitation on excessive property ownership. 95 His model of labor was one of continual
nurturing of the land.
[F]or as a Man had a Right to all he could imploy [sic] his Labour
upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could
make use of. This left no room for Controversie [sic] about the Title, nor for Incroachment [sic] on the Right of others; what Portion
a Man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless as well as
dishonest to carve himself too much, or take more than he
96
needed.
This explanation of Locke's view of property, as well as his earlier
limiting statement that "no Man but he can have a right to what that is
once joyned [sic] to, at least where there is enough, and as good left
in common for others,"9 7 suggest that Locke was not the father of
natural rights in copyright. 98 Locke never extended his model be-

yond the issue in question: the source for sovereign authority over
property and workers. His model served as a touchstone for the
91

See Chartier, supra note 29, at 13.
Id. at 13-14 (citation omitted).
9-1 See Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of
Modern Authorship, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAw, supra note 29,
at 32.
94
Id. at 33 (quoting WILLIAM ENFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON LITERARY PROPERTY 21
(1774)).
95 See LOCKE, supra note 82, bk. II § 51.
96
Id.
97 Id.
98 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1563 (1993).
92
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American Revolution, including Jefferson's rhetoric regarding the
rights of mankind, 99 but Locke's own writings were outside the controversies that formed the basis of modern copyright. 0 0
Further, Locke's view of natural rights would hardly have provided answers in difficult cases. Certainly, that authors were entitled
to payment for their work provided a benefit to the common good.
Locke himself adopted precisely this economic rationale for his natural right: "he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not
lessen but increase the common stock of mankind."1'0 The corollary
of Locke's view of progress and property was that man should be given
limited exclusivity of his property for the benefit of all mankind.
Rather than serving as a counterpoint to the economic based model
of U.S. constitutional rights, Locke could well be cited for the proposition that copyright should exist " [t] o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'1 2 If Locke can serve as the basis for promoting copyright under
both the natural law rationale and the economic incentive rationale,
then natural rights provides no deontological framework for under10 3
standing the modern copyright paradigm.
It is also ironic that the English printers and booksellers, who
were seeking an alternative to the perpetual monopoly they had enjoyed under the Stationers' Company and the Licensing Act (which
had lapsed and then been replaced with the relatively short copyright
terms of the Statute of Anne), championed the natural rights ap99

See, e.g.,
BENJAMIN

FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL

LAw: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 97 (1931).

100 See generally Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The CulturalConsequences of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (1994) (arguing that the basis of
modern copyright law is a "consequentialist" theory, which asserts that the purpose of copyright is to create incentives for artist creativity).
101
LOCKE, supra note 82, bk. II § 37.
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
103 Justin Hughes describes Locke's theory as providing an incomplete basis and instead ascribes a more "personality" based theory to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. See
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual PIroperty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 329-30 (1988). Despite Professor Hughes's suggestion, Hegel's individualist or "Wirklichkeit" theory provides
an even shallower basis for copyright. At the heart of the individualist theory is the personality right "'to claim that external world as its own.'" Id. at 331 (citation omitted). While
authorship and the creation of expression certainly fit this mold, so does the act of adapting other authors' works or even the simple act of observing someone else's work. At its
extreme, the phrase "they're playing our song" takes on a personality-based meaning because the possession or interaction with the object creates a personality imprint for the
audience member. Copyright based on such a model provides no guidance regarding the
interests of the author, publisher, consumer, adaptor, or performer-each has an equal
share such that no copyright regime based on such a model can arise. But cf Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (endorsing a personalitybased approach).
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proach.10 4 The practice was to transfer the copyright to the publisher
or bookseller, 1 5 so the length of copyright protection aided the author only to the extent that the author received a larger advance payment. There is no empirical evidence, but it is quite likely that the
fees paid to authors did not go down when Donaldson v. Beckett' 0 6 established that once the statutory period expired a work became part
of the public domain."1 7 Transfer of the copyright allowed the parties
to effect by two steps what had been prohibited by one; had the House
of Lords come to an opposite conclusion in Donaldson, the practical
result would have been to reestablish the Stationers' Company Act.'10
Whatever the source of interest in Donaldson, the result was to
limit the ultimate term of copyright in any work published under the
Statute of Anne, putting a cap on the natural rights assertion of ownership in a work. This does not reduce the importance of Locke as
the theoretical fount from which the natural rights approach developed; this line of support was simply subject to limitation by statute in
England and later in the United States.
This was the approach taken by the United States in Wheaton v.
Peters.10 9 In a decision closely paralleling Donaldson, the Supreme
Court had to determine whether a natural right to copyright existed
in the United States, and to frame the scope of that right. The Court
readily recognized the natural right in an author's work, but further
held that the statute divested the right upon publication, in favor of
the statutory scheme, just as the House of Lords determined in
Donaldson:
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of
it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realize a profit
by its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very different
right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in
the future publication of the work, after the author shall have published it to the world.
The argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the
product of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be
controverted. And the answer is, that he realizes this product by the
See Rose, supra note 93, at 25.
id. at 31.
106 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
107 The practice of the London Booksellers was to purchase the copyright outright
rather than to pay an ongoing royalty or percentage. The Statute of Anne therefore provided for two estates, the second of which was available "if, at the end of [the initial fourteen year] term, the author himself be living, the right shall then return to him for another
term of the same duration." BLACKSTONE, suli note 19, at ii 407.
108
Cf Rose, supra note 93, at 37-39.
109
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
104

105
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transfer of his manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when first

published. 110
In this way, the Court acknowledged both the basis of the Lockean natural rights underpinning in U.S. constitutional and statutory
law, as well as its statutory limitations. "That every man is entitled to
the fruits of his own labour must be admitted; but he can enjoy them
only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property, which
regulate society, and which define the rights of things in general.""I
The Court certainly does not fully embrace natural rights. This becomes clear in light of the stirring dissent by Justice Thompson who
chides the Court for failing to see the "right and wrong" in the common law that it has rejected. 1 2 Despite the dissent's call for embracing natural rights, however, the language of the opinion does not
paint an absolute rejection of natural rights. The direct consequence
of Wheaton should not be to reject the natural rights approach from
U.S. copyright jurisprudence, but rather to recognize that these rights
can be statutorily refrained, though not extinguished. As a result of
Wheaton, the relationship between natural and economic theory can
be articulated.
One view ascribing the origins of copyright to natural rights gains
its legitimacy from Locke's fertile soil. Having come this far, however,
the jurisprudential question provides little normative guidance. Natural rights suggest an absolute right to first publication, as did the
Wheaton divestiture of common law copyright upon publication.'"'
Beyond the point of first publication, there is less guidance. Professor
Yen and Professor Jessica Litman each suggest that natural rights create a justification for a strong public domain.' 14 Yen points out that
the iterative process of authorship and creativity require that little is
gleaned from the field so that each generation of authors has ample
15
space in which to labor.'
Natural rights may thus provide the basis for limiting copyright by
emphasizing the limitation in Locke's original statement that an author "can have a right to what that is once joyned [sic] to, at least
where there is enough, and as good left in common for others" ' 1 6 but
that "it was useless as well as dishonest to carve himself too much, or
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 657.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 671 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 657.
See Yen, supra note 79, at 552-53 (citing Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EM-

OR' LJ. 965 (1990)).
115
See id. at 554

("Unlike Locke's gatherer of acorns, authors do not truly labor
alone.... No author has lived an entire life on a proverbial desert island. Instead, authors
live and work as members of an artistic community and a broader society whose creations,
values and experiences form an integral part of the author's creative vision.").
116 LocKE, supra note 82, bk. II § 27.
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take more than he needed."' 17 If natural rights were thought of as a
limitation on statutory rights, this might provide some popular support, but it provides guidance no less vague than any economic theory
or other rationalization of copyright's contours.
The expansion of an author's natural rights is less clear in the
modern context. The initial concern regarding natural rights was the
term of the copyright. Those espousing natural rights advocated a
perpetual copyright."I 8 Nonetheless, the European nations that more
explicitly adopted the natural rights philosophy never granted such a
right and have adopted the Berne Convention requirement that the
copyright term last for fifty years following the life of the author." 19
2.

The Unnecessary Extension of Moral Rights into Natural Law

Natural rights might suggest that moral rights such as droit moral
and droit de suite12°' are inherent in all copyrights and a necessity under
the law.121 The rights of attribution and integrity are embodied in
article 6bis of the Berne Convention and are often treated as an axio22
matic component of the natural rights regimes provided to authors.'
Despite the traditional relationship between natural rights and these
so-called moral rights, however, nothing dictates that the latter be provided in any specific manner. Whether the natural rights were subject
to negotiations between author and publisher, or whether the law
treated them as inextinguishable and nontransferable, has more to do
with the relationship between the state and its citizens than with the
natural or economic rights of its citizens.' 23 According to William Pa117 Id. bk. II § 51.
118 See, e.g., Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have
the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 Loy. L.A. ENr. L. Rxv. 509, 536 (1995).
119 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, art. 7, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter
Berne Convention]. Germany's extension to life plus seventy was motivated more to compensate the authors who lost economic opportunities as a result of the two world wars
prompted by Germany in the twentieth century. See Richard Morrison, The Rights that Don't
Smell Quite Right, LONDON TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at 41 ("While most of the world set its
copyright term at life plus 50 years, the Germans opted for 70-apparently to compensate
their authors for 'loss of earnings' during the two world wars (well, whose fault was
that?).").
120
See Susan P. Liemer, UnderstandingArtists' Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 41, 42 (1998) ("Moral rights are akin to rights of personality or personal civil rights.").
According to Liemer, moral rights encompass five specific rights: "the rights of attribution,
integrity, disclosure, withdrawal, and resale royalties." Id. at 46.
121
S.TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986).
122 Berne Convention, supra note 119, art. 6bis.
123 The Berne Convention, however, mandates an inalienable, personal right. Such
rights are granted "'[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after transfer of the said rights, [the author retains] the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action ...
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.' William Belanger, US. Compliance
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try, "[t]hese type of restrictions (coupled with droits moral) stem from
civil law's highly protective policy toward individual authors, in contrast with the laissez faire approach of common law countries." 124 Another characterization makes a similar point:
Accordingly, the U.S. Copyright Act is geared towards promoting
innovation and a healthy information industry by providing sufficient incentives to potential creators, while at the same time preserving a "robust" public domain. Perceived from this constitutional
perspective, copyright law may be seen as an instrument of information policy, both by protecting and "unprotecting" certain subject
matter within the domain of literature, science and art....
Unlike the United States, continental-European "authors'
rights" are based primarily on notions of natural justice: "authors'
rights are not created by law but always existed in the legal consciousness of man." In the pure droit d'auteurphilosophy, copyright
is an essentially unrestricted natural right reflecting the "sacred"
125
bond between the author and his personal creation.
If this is a fair characterization of natural rights, then the idea
that natural rights would embrace a robust public domain is fundamentally misplaced. The sacrilege of fair use, parody, and the public
domain would tear at this sacred bond between author and work.
Anointing the author's relationship with his work as essential and unrestricted stands in diametric opposition to the open marketplace of
ideas idealized in the United States. Because moral rights are not assignable and in many instances not contractually waivable, natural
rights are inconsistent with copyright rules permitting unauthorized
copying or adaptation.
Nor are the contours of natural law self-evident. Though natural
rights theory suggests that all copyrights are perpetual, this notion has
been universally rejected. Although Professors Yen and Litman suggest the public domain would expand under a theory of natural
rights, 2 6 the inalienable moral rights implicitly granted by the natural
rights approach serve to limit rather than expand unauthorized uses
of copyrighted works. The inconsistencies in the length and scope of
copyright protection further illustrate how little guidance the natural

with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON L. REv. 373, 389 (1995) (quoting Berne Convention, supra note 119, art. 6bis(1)).
124
William Parry, Choice of Law and InternationalCopyright, 48 Am. J. CoMp. L. 383, 432

(2000).
125
P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Commentary, Copyright, Contract and Code: What Will Remain of
the Public Domain?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 81-82 (2000) (quoting EDWARD W. PLOMAN &
L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 13
(1980)).
126
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

1302

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1278

rights philosophy provides in determining the contours of copyright
12 7
policy.
Furthermore, while the rights of attribution to the author and
integrity of an author's work find recognition in a combination of unfair competition and copyright laws in the United States,1'2 other examples of moral rights may be more controversial. The natural rights
included can range widely and typically encompass:
[T]he right to be known as the author of one's work; the right to
prevent others from being named author of one's work; the right to
prevent others from deforming or defacing one's work; the right to
prevent others from falsely claiming authorship of a work; the right
to withdraw a published work; and the right to prevent others from
using the work or the author's name in a manner which would vio29
late the author's good name or professional standing.'

There is likely little controversy that the author or artist of a work
is entitled to the public attribution of that work, which includes both
the power to be named as author and the power to insist that others
not be given that designation. On the other hand, the right to prevent deforming and defacing may run afoul of the importance in U.S.
culture of parody and satire as forms of commentary and criticism.' 1°
127 The same failure to provide guidance was noted by Professor Patry with regards to
the copyright extension. See William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 913-14 (1997).

[W]hile the two rationales (instrumental and natural rights) are frequently
complementary, on occasion if viewed as independent objectives they may
lead policy-makers in different directions. A strictly instrumental approach
would probably deny copyright protection to works of architecture-the
actual, built three-dimensional structure-because it is highly unlikely that
the carrot of copyright will encourage architects to build. A natural rights
approach, based on recognizing genius, would grant protection because
the architect's creative efforts are on an equal par with many other works
protected by copyright, and thus the architect is equally entitled to
recognition.
Whether a natural rights theory can withstand rigorous analysis apart
from an instrumental purpose fortunately need not be resolved here, since
the grant of an additional period of copyright protection in preexisting
works to entities or individuals who do not create works of authorship fails
under either rationale.
Id.
128 See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1393 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying contract
principles to reputational interest of licensor); Lamothe v. At. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d
1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that naming fewer than all the joint authors could
result in an unfair competition cause of action); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14
(2d Cir. 1976) ("[C] ourts have long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work
by relying on theories outside the statutory law of copyright, such as contract law . . .");
Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating that shortening of recorded performance constituted unfair competition by mis-attributing endorsement of concert promoter);
Prouty v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939) (discussing unfair
competition).
129
Belanger, supra note 123, at 383.
1-(0
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-81 (1994).
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The need for parody is part of the U.S. cultural demand that certain
works be "unprotected" against certain uses. 3 1 With regard to the
right to withdraw a copyrighted work from the marketplace, however,
the rift between economic rights and natural rights would prove
absolute.
In the U.S., the First Sale doctrine provides the right to display
and to resell a particular copy of a work.132 In some countries, such as
England, the authors of work enjoy income from a public statutory
lending right.' 3 3 The United States has never seriously considered
providing such income protection. 134 To the extent any consideration has been given to the U.S. adoption of a public lending right, the
following provides an illustrative response:
There are several different ways to structure [a public lending right]
to fit the existing limitations and requirements of copyright. However, such a course goes against the primary purpose of copyright
protection, benefiting the public....
[A public lending right] maintains the illusion that authors are
in fact entitled to such payments, rather than receiving them because Congress has decided support for authors is a worthwhile social goal.
Supporting authors, and the arts in general, is indeed worthwhile and necessary, and there is no need to hide such support behind the facade of "payments to compensate for library usage." The
true goal should be to assist those who are engaged in culturally
beneficial activities, and that goal standing alone is sufficient justifiits
cation for any support scheme. [A public lending right], with
13 5
conceptual and practical problems, is not the way to proceed.
Recharacterizing a public lending right as a public welfare program rather than a natural property right for the author turns the
rationalization for such a moral right on its head. Given the central
role of the First Sale doctrine, 13 6 however, such an approach is not
terribly surprising.
Even more suspect is any claim of a right to withdraw a work from
the public. When one valid copyright holder attempted to withdraw
131
132
133

See Hugenholtz, supra note 125, at 81.
17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
Droit De
Simon Hughes, Equal Treatment for Artists Under Copyright Law and the E.U.'s

Suite, in 4 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS
149, 149 n.3 (Lionel Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998). "The Public Lending Right
Act [of] 1979 [in England] provides an author with a royalty of 2p for each borrowing of
one of their books from a public library up to an annual maximum of £6,000." Id.
SeeJennifer M. Schneck, Note, Closing the Book on the Public Lending Right,63 N.Y.U.
134
L. REV. 878, 880-82 (1988) (arguing that a public lending right is economically unjustified
and deserves no place within U.S. copyright law).
135
Id. at 910.
136
17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
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the works he owned, the courts held that the public had a First
37
Amendment right to access and to make fair use of those works.'
Howard Hughes, the famous inventor, aviator, and recluse, attempted
to gain control over biographies written about him by purchasing the
copyrights. As copyright owner, he challenged other uses of those
works.' 33 The court gave little credence to his claims as copyright
holder, emphasizing instead the importance of disseminating the
copyrighted material. 39 "'To Promote the Progress of Science and
the Useful Arts'. . . 'courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest in
the development of art, science and industry."1 40 The values of free
speech and access of content to the public outweigh any authorial interest in control of once-published works.
Thus, neither natural rights nor moral rights serve as the underlying ethical imperative governing the public response to copyright.
Neither the lending right nor the right to withdraw fit within the social or legal framework accepted within the United States. Rights of
attribution and integrity are more consistent with existing U.S. copyright protection, whether explicitly recognized for works of visual
art' 4' or more generally through the exclusive control afforded to au42
thors and copyright owners.'
3.

Natural Law's Necessary Application-The Right of First
Publication

Perhaps the only clear expansion of copyright that can be attributed to natural rights is that of the first publication right. 43 Black137 Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968), affld, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
18 Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 304-05 (2d Cir.
1966).
139 See id. at 307. Of course the moral right would be retained by the author, rather
than transferred to the copyright owner, potentially injuring the copyright holder's interests as well as those of the public.
140 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8 and Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544
(2d Cir. 1964)).
141
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
142 See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1393, 1379 (1st Cir. 1993); Lamothe v. Ad. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24
(2d Cir. 1976); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
143 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985)
("Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance
of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use."); Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1987) (following Harper & Row to protect the
private letters ofJ.D. Salinger from use by a biographer). But see Kenneth D. Crews, Fair
Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1,
33-36 (1999) (decrying the limitations on fair use implicated by a first publication right
and the implicit use of privacy doctrine to provide the basis for such a right).

NORMATIVE COPYRIGHT

20031

1305

stone articulated the first publication right as the common law of
England. "When a man by the exertion of his rational powers has
produced an original work, he seems to have clearly a right to dispose
of that identical work as he pleases, and any attempt to vary the disposition he has made of it appears to be an invasion of that right."'144
Greater protection of the first publication right would put the author
in a better position to extract economic reward as well as to negotiate
for moral rights from the publisher, if they were valued by the author.
The critical aspect of the first publication right is that it puts each
author in charge of his or her own priorities, allowing authors to maximize their own incentives, thus maximizing efficiency and reward.
This was the original tradeoff articulated by the Supreme Court in
Wheaton, 14 5 and despite the congressional removal of publication as
the basis for copyright protection, the Wheaton reasoning continues to
provide sound guidance.
Congress has been ambivalent regarding the scope for any such
first publication right, amending the Fair Use section as a result of
controversies surrounding fair use and unpublished works. 146 As

modified, § 107 now adds the proviso that "[t] he fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors."14 7 This ambiguous
addition to fair use is not consistent with a natural rights view that the
pre-publication rights of an author are almost absolute. It does not,
however, seem to significantly change the judicial approach to unpublished works in any meaningful manner. 148 Even under this expanded
definition of rights to protect first publication, the natural rights view
may have only marginal impact. To the extent that the "natural" right
and use protected is specifically that of first publication, the remaining possible fair uses contemplated in § 107, such as commentary and
criticism, should not be automatically circumscribed. 14 9 The Fourth
Circuit recently reviewed an unauthorized copying of a 1928 unpublished book manuscript, finding that the rights of first publication
were not implicated when only two copies were made, one for authensupra note 19, at ii 405.
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
146
SeeAct of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145, 3145 (1992) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 107 regarding unpublished works).
147
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
148
See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Henson, Nos. 97-16160, 98-16146, 1999 WL 362837
(9th Cir. June 4, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000).
149
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
144

145

BLACKSTONE,
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tication and the other for archival purposes. 15 0 The two copies were
fair use. 15 1 As this illustrates, greater respect for first publication
rights does not automatically eliminate all claims of fair use for unpublished works.
Ultimately, the question is whether the natural rights approach
provides any normative guidance to the public, industry, and the
courts. If there is no right and wrong in copyright protection so that
only statutory construction sets the norms, then Congress should have
a free hand in adjusting the law to match the interests of the stakeholders. If instead natural law dictates certain outcomes, then the
public will accept those principles. By extension, Congress must respect those natural rights as should the courts.
Based on the foregoing analysis, at its core, natural rights protect
two aspects of copyright. First is the Lockean notion that authors are
entitled to possess and enjoy the fruits of their labors. Second, until
divested by first publication in exchange for statutory benefits, authors
enjoy sovereignty over their works. Unfortunately, similar to the analysis of copyright's intangible nature, the philosophical framework of
natural rights provides little normative guidance towards the shape of
copyright or its continued development.
II
ECONOMIC COPYRIGHT, PROMOTING PROGRESS, AND THE
ROLE OF INCENTIVES

The economic rationale is widely viewed as the primary philosophical underpinning for U.S. copyright law and policy. This policy
is conceptually simple: "The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return
for their labors." 152 The policy "'is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,
and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
' '
limited period of exclusive control has expired. " 153
The power to create a balance between the author and the public
may be the most significant philosophical distinction between a natural rights theory of copyright and an economic rationale. Under the
natural rights theory, the power over one's writings is a "'sacred"' liberty that cannot be limited for the public good, 154 whereas the eco150

See Sundernan v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 204-06 (4th Cir. 1998).

151
152

Id.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (citing
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
153
Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984)).
154
Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary Franceand
America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 29, at 151. The
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nomic rationale allows for a balancing between the interests of the
public in accessing the good and the right of the author to receive an
economic reward.

55

Professor Jane Ginsburg has provided groundbreaking historical
research suggesting that during the inception of U.S. and French
copyright law, the economic and natural rights approaches were not
particularly distinct.15 6 Indeed, as noted earlier, Locke's own rhetoric
suggests that the basis for protecting copyright is to promote progress
and the useful arts. 157 Nonetheless, the economic rationale for copyright serves as the central guiding theme for U.S. jurisprudence,
which both expands and limits copyright.
A.

The Economic Balance

The economic balance assumes that an incentive or reward must
be placed before the authors so that they will continue to pursue their
interest and create works of public value.158 On the other side of the
balance is the concern that any monopoly or exclusionary right too
strongly ensconced will unfairly enrich the author at the expense of
the public. Such cost will create a barrier to public dissemination and
use, thereby limiting the value of the work to the public.
This balance was articulated by Lord Mansfield in 1801:
"[W] e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for
the service of the community, may not be deprived of theirjust merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the
of improvements, nor the progress of
world may not be deprived
59
the arts be retarded."'
laws following the French Revolution recognized the "'sacred' right to property enunciated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man." Id.
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
155
See Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 136-39.
156
See LocKE, supra note 82, bk. II § 37; cf Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be For
157
Ever Caught Between Marketplaceand Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS
ON COPYRIGHT LAw, supra note 29, at 174 (noting that Locke provided the "initial premise"
for the marketplace theory, which holds that "copyright provides market incentives for
creating and communicating works").
158
Professor Hardy questions why this is the introductory question:
Why is it that "Congress" must draw the appropriate balance? We do not,
after all, say that Congress should draw the appropriate balance between
the interests of "toothbrush producers" and "toothbrush consumers." ...
Congress makes copyright law as a matter of positive law, not natural
rights. If authors have no natural rights, and Congress makes copyright
law, then Congress can establish or terminate, expand or contract, those
rights in whatever ways and for whatever reasons it sees fit ....
[T]his view gets it backwards.
Hardy, supra note 45, at 242-43.
159
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1975) (quoting
Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b) (1801) (Mansfield, J.)).
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This balance was first sought in the Statute of Anne, whereby the lord
archbishop of Canterbury and certain other offices had the power to
regulate the cost of the books if any person brought forth a
1 60

complaint.

The natural rights theory provides for an inherent property and
paternity interest in an author's works. Assuming that this approach
to copyright differs philosophically from a social utility approach, the
two theoretical starting points do not necessarily serve to shape the
power of balancing in any practical manner. Both share a common
basis in authorship as property. Landes and Posner explain the economic nature of a property right as follows:
A property right is an exclusive right to the use, control, and enjoyment of some resource-that is, a right to exclude anyone else in
the world from using the resource without the consent of the owner
of the right, irrespective of any argument that the general welfare,
whether defined in economic or any other terms, would be in61
creased by transferring the right to someone else.'
1'o

See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), art. V 1710 http://www.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Statute of Anne (last visited Apr. 21, 2003).
[I]f any bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, shall ... set a price
upon, or sell, or expose to sale, any book or books at such a price or rate as
shall be conceived by any person or persons to be too high and unreasonable; it shall and may be lawful for any person or persons, to make complaint
thereof to the lord archbishop of Canterbury for the time being, the lord
chancellor, or lord keeper of the great seal of Great Britain for the time
being, the lord bishop of London for the time being, the lord chief justice
of the court of Queen's Bench, the lord chief justice of the court of Common Pleas, the lord chief baron of the court of Exchequer for the time
being, the vice chancellors of the two universities for the time being, in that
part of Great Britain called England; the lord president of the sessions for
the time being, the lord chief justice general for the time being, the lord
chief baron of the Exchequer for the time being, the rector of the college
of Edinburgh for the time being, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland; who, or any one of them, shall and have hereby full power and authority, from time to time, to send for, summon, or call before him or them
such bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, and to examine and
[i]nquire of the reason of the dearness and inhauncement [sic] of the
price or value of such book or books by him or them so sold or exposed to
sale; and if upon such [i] nquiry and examination it shall be found, that the
price of such book or books is inhaunced [sic], or any wise too high or
unreasonable, then [the above authorities] so [i]nquiring and examining,
have hereby full power and authority to reform and redress the same, and
to limit and settle the price of every such printed book and books, from
time to time, according to the best of their judgments, and as to them shall
seem just and reasonable; and in case of alteration of the rate or price from
what was set or demanded by such bookseller or booksellers, printer or
printers, to award and order such bookseller and booksellers, printer and
printers, to pay all the costs and charges that the person or persons so complaining shall be put unto, by reason of such complaint, and of the causing
such rate or price to be so limited and settled ....
Id.
1I1
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT

29 (1987).

LAw

2003]

NORMATIVE COPYRIGHT

1309

Despite the exclusivity described above, Landes and Posner acknowledge that "[p]roperty rights in law, however, are never so absolute ....
,,162 Eminent domain laws, easements, and other legal
doctrines limit the absolutist nature that exclusivity suggests.1 63 In
contrast, liability rules provide no right to exclude but create a claim
to damages when the resource is damaged in certain ways. 164 Importantly, these complement each other. "Often property rights and liability rules coexist in the same resource .

.

.

.

[A] person has a

property right against someone who strikes him deliberately and without justification, but he enjoys only the protection of a liability rule
16 5
against someone who strikes him accidentally."'
In his attempt to debunk the need for an extended copyright
term, Professor (now Supreme Court Justice) Breyer suggested that
non-economic interests in copyright could be protected with other regimes, such as tort law. 16 6 What this suggestion ignored, however, was
precisely Landes and Posner's point: the same item may be protected
by both property and tort rules, with the appropriate rule utilized depending on the efficiency as measured by the transaction costs involved. 167 In the same manner, property interests can be expanded or
contracted to meet social and economic needs without denying the
property interest created.
The role of the common law and legislature is to balance property and liability interests. This is true of real property, as Landes and
Posner point out with their examples of crop damage caused by railroad sparks. 168 Property may be protected only with liability rules-or
may lose legal protection in full-if the social and economic interests
are deemed to demand it. This does not mean it is no longer property, only that exclusivity may be limited.
If all property is subject to the legal balance between the exclusive owner and the public, then intellectual property is merely the
realm in which the balancing is most explicitly acknowledged. The
constitutional phrase "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts . .. "16 has been characterized as necessitating the balance be162

Id.

163 Id. at 29-31. The Landes and Posner example of farms and trains serves as a good
analogy. Tort law rather than property law is used to benefit the railroads (when trains
shoot sparks into neighboring fields) because of the public benefit of railroad transportation. Id. at 31-38.
164
See id. at 30.
165
Id.
166
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 290 (1970).
167
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 161, at 30-31.
168
See id. at 36-37.
169
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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tween copyright or property owners and those that would seek to use
17
the copyrighted works. °
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the power of Congress to adjust the balance of rights between authors, publishers, and
the public. As the Court explained, "Congress['s] adjustment of the
author/publisher balance is a permissible expression of the 'economic philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause],' i.e., 'the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort [motivated] by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare."' 171
The normative question is not whether such balancing can take
place, but how to create a reasoned framework for setting or shifting
the balance. 172 As Landes and Posner have stated, "[s] triking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in
copyright law."1 7 3 Where normative copyright may separate itself
from the economic copyright espoused by Landes and Posner, Justice
Stephen Breyer, 174 Professor Pamela Samuelson,17 5 and many
others, 176 is the need to take more than production incentives into
account in fashioning the balance between the rights of copyright
owners and the public. This balance needs to account for the effect
that natural rights interests of authors, the intangible attributes of intellectual property, and the normative impact shifts in copyright policy have on other regimes of property protection (as evidenced in
arenas such as plagiarism and, possibly, shoplifting).
B.

Promoting Progress Beyond Economics

The economic approach, although typically ascribed to the constitutional phrase "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts," is not necessarily coextensive. Many copyright exclusive rights
are non-economic and yet serve to promote progress in a meaningful
170

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (Story, J.) ("[I]n truth,

in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an
abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science
and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and
used before." (citing Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
4,436))).
171 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954))).
172
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 782 (2003).
173 Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326.
174 Breyer, supra note 166, at 291-93.
175 Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 20, at 237-38.
176
E.g., PeterJaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991
DUKE L.J. 455; Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 873 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTwARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

(1996)).
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and efficient manner. 177 While broader public economic efficiency
may have been implicit in the constitutional text, no such suggestion
appeared when contemporary courts were framing the nature of copyright and fair use. 178 The Supreme Court gave a very different explanation of the promotion of progress in 1879. In Baker v. Selden,179 the
Court explained the quid pro quo between author and public: "[T] he
teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful art have
their final end in application and use; and this application and use are
what the public derive from the publication of a book which teaches
them." 10 By protecting the expression, the public gets the benefit of
the underlying ideas; economics may be wholly irrelevant.
1.

The Incentive to Choose Creativity

Without discrediting all economic theory, one can imagine alternatives that complement abstract economic models. For example, in
the music industry, the copyright holder of a song composition is typically paid at or below the statutory royalty rate for the initial sound
recording of the composition. 18' As a result, the payments do not increase because the statute limits payments to subsequent productions
of the sound recording. Nonetheless, Congress has provided that only
subsequent reproductions of the song are subject to a statutory
82

royalty. 1

Economic theory dictates that no distinction need be made between the first recording and all subsequent recordings because the
payments remain the same with or without the exception for ihe first
recording. Furthermore, physical access to the composition makes
the distinction almost superfluous, adding complexity and transaction
costs. Thus, the economic model would eliminate any distinction between the first recording and subsequent recordings of the
composition.
177 See Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 249, 262
(1997) ("Copyright's essential strategy is to manipulate directly an aspect of the legal system-securing exclusive rights to authors-to accomplish a goal that cannot be achieved
by direct manipulation-increasing the quantity and quality of the works to which the
public has access.").
178 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (establishing the idea-expression dichotomy); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (noting the statutory nature of
copyright); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) No. 4901 (Story,J.) (providing framework of fair use); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) No. 5728
(Story, J.) (finding copyright infringement and discussing generally the types of copying
that would become known as fair use).
179 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
180 Id. at 104.
181 See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 659-60 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing fee structure).
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (1) (2000).
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Yet the importance of controlling the first publication transcends
both the economic issues and the limited risk of premature access.
Congress recognized how critical the musician's first exposure could
be to the success or failure of the artist.' 8 3 Success in the marketplace
may be economic, associated with the number of copies sold, or it may
be aesthetic, captured in music reviews, critical acclaim, and professional reputation within the industry. These aesthetic successes may
someday translate into economics, but it is equally possible that they
will not. Economics cannot be the basis for valuing the marketplace
of ideas. "Deciding which works are worthy of copyright, and, therefore, which authors deserve remuneration, is rife with potential for
oppression of unpopular persons and suppression of unpopular
84

ideas." 1

The relationship between critical success and commercial success
is not well known.18 5 Nonetheless, the ability of an author or artist to
control the timing and distribution of projects may be critical to the
success or failure of her career, not just the particular work. This
reputational control may also be achieved by Congress and the courts
86
outside of the copyright statute. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,'
the unfair competition provision of the U.S. Trademark Law, provides
for significant relief for misuse of an author's identity8 7 and may extend to protect the integrity of the work as well.' 8 8
Before trying to explain why the scope of copyright should not be
expanded beyond that afforded by the 1909 Copyright Act, Professor
Breyer attempted to dismiss the non-economic aspects of copyright
protection because such interests would undermine his economic
analysis. 18 9 Citing the Register of Copyrights, what states that "the law
'has an important secondary purpose: To give authors the reward due

183
SeeJon Garon, Director'sChoice: The FineLine Between Interpretationand Infringement of
an Author's Work, 12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 277, 278-79 (1988) (discussing the importance of first performance rights for playwrights).
184
Schaumann, supra note 177, at 261.
185
Some filmmakers, such as Woody Allen, are considered to be critical successes de-

spite limited commercial appeal. See Allen to Attend Cannes, SAN

DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB.,

Apr. 9,

2002, at E3. Many examples of the opposite are also recognized, with films, books, and
CDs often defying critics' predictions about audience acclaim. See also Schaumann, supra
note 177, at 261 & n.51 (discussing such works).
186
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
187
See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000); Dr. Seuss Enters.,
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403-05 (9th Cir. 1997); Cleary v. News
Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1259-62 (9th Cir. 1994); Lamothe v. At. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d
1403, 1405-08 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981).
188 Cf Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding no Lanham Act
infringement because the two works in question were not sufficiently similar).
189 See Breyer, supra note 166, at 284-91.
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Breyer questions the na-

ture of copyright's reward system. He suggests that the reward cannot
be merely the "amount of money needed to persuade a man to write a
book."' 9 Instead, he suggests that it must be "the 'value' of [the author's] work to society-a value that might be measured in terms of
what those who benefit from the book would be willing to pay rather
than do without it."192 This reward, Breyer asserts, is not one society
currently offers.
Instead of attempting to assess the incalculable value to society,
Breyer should have discussed whether the then Register of Copyrights
sought to address the opportunity costs which face the most gifted of
authors and artists. Success in any of the copyright industries is fickle
and often short-lived. Most novelists could make a good living writing
business copy and most composers would be successful writing advertising jingles. Gainfully employed teachers need never write books,
celebrities would shun autobiographies, and in general, Breyer's
mechanistically efficient version of copyright would produce a poorer
body of work for the public's education and enjoyment. 93 Breyer
reached this result because he emphasized the publisher's ability to
control the market through contract rather than the author's ability
t 94
to exploit all her exclusive rights.
Work within the traditional employment settings' 95 might provide ample and far more secure economic incentives to create. To
overcome the risks of authorship and production in the copyright industries, the Register of Copyrights correctly identified that both successful and unsuccessful authors may have elected to forego more
predictable rewards for the incentives that arise from copyright's protection of exclusive rights. Because the alternative opportunities are
presumably more rewarding and lucrative for those who are more ca190

Id. at 285 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 8 7 TH CONG., REPORT OF THE

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 5 (Comm.

Print 1961)).
'91

192

Id.

Id. In the accompanying footnote, he admits that such a measure is incalculable.
See id. n.19.
193 Breyer ignores the fact that non-commercial materials are financed using models
other than direct sales. Academic journals have the costs absorbed by charitable, tax exempt educational institutions; and religious publications are also typically nonprofit and
tax exempt, receiving both the tax advantage and charitable donations. In addition, other
models generate pay for the distribution of content. For example, commercial radio and
television use sponsorships and advertising, and computer programs and software come
bundled with hardware and equipment. As a result, an analysis of distribution is not particularly relevant to the underlying economic value of copyright itself.
194 See Breyer, supra note 166, at 293-94 (focusing his economic analysis exclusively on
book production rather than authorship).
195 The work-made-for-hire provisions in the Copyright Act address these, vesting the
employer as copyright owner of the work. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (b) (2000).
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pable, copyright's incentive is particularly important to entice those
196
who have the most to give up.
The need to create incentives to encourage authorship is not an
outgrowth of natural rights, but an economic reality-the risks borne
by the author are often greater than those felt by the publishers or
producers. 1.' 7 Breyer's analysis fails to provide any meaningful models
because he dismisses all costs other than the marginal costs of the
publishers and producers. The Landes and Posner economic analysis,
on the other hand, provides a more useful economic guide because it
focuses on the costs to the creators of the work at both the author and
g
publisher level' 98
Another variation on this theme focuses on the avoidance cost
associated with the activity of creating intellectual property. Under
this theory, reward commensurate with the endeavor is necessary to
motivate authors and inventors. 99 But the problem with the avoidance approach is self-evident. "If we believe that an avoidance theory
of labor justifies intellectual property, we are left with two categories
of ideas: those whose production required unpleasant labor and those
produced by enjoyable labor. Are the latter to be denied protection?
This strange result applies to all fruits of labor, not just intellectual
property."2 01 There is no meaningful societal value to the unpleasant
works, and this was never considered important. The two goals of incentives are to allow for a sufficient return on investment (so that it is
economically rewarding to produce works) and to value the works
highly enough that valuable works are created. The first of these goals
is based on notions of market efficiency for publishers; the second on
196 To model the argument, assume the income of an author would be $50,000 as a
college professor. Further, assume that approximately twenty percent of published novels
are financially successful. A risk-neutral individual would anticipate $250,000 in royalties
for a successful book to reflect the one-in-five chance of recouping the foregone salary.
This formula does not take into account the percentage of novel manuscripts that are not
accepted for publication. For a more detailed discussion in the context of fine art, see
Daniel J. Gifford, Innovation and Creativity in the Fine Arts: The Relevance and Irrelevance of
Copyright, 18 CARnozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569 (2000).
197 See WA'rr, supra note 78, at 4 ("[I]f all consumers were to free ride, then it is likely
that creative members of society will dedicate their efforts to other better paid activities,
with the corresponding loss of important cultural assets, of considerable social value, that
would otherwise have existed.").
198 Breyer, Landes and Posner come closest to agreement on the issue of copyright
term. This makes sense because, as Landes and Posner point out, there is little economic
value to the author of the extended copyright term. "[E]ven in the unlikely event that [a]
work will still generate a substantial income in [its] one hundredth year, the present value
of that expectation will be virtually zero." Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 363. See also
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 807 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("It seems fair to say
that, for example, a I% likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years
into the future, is worth less than seven cents today.").
199 See Hughes, supra note 103, at 302-04.
201) Id. at 305.
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the economic need to make the activity competitive with other lucrative endeavors.
Beginning in 1709, England singled out intellectual property
from other areas of law, distinctly from other forms of labor. 20 ' The
United States 20 2 and even France took similar approaches. 20° The underlying basis was a recognition that intellectual enterprise serves the
public in a manner fundamentally different from other forms of labor, and thus needs to be clothed with sufficient reward for the most
capable to serve society in this capacity. The alternative system, based
on "evils of an authorship dependent upon private or public patronage," would put the incentive system in the hands of the government or self-appointed arbiters of culture. 2°4 This was part of the
fundamental shift away from a patronage system where such works
were dependent on elite property owners. 20 5 To transcend the comfort of the patron system, the reward had to be quite significant.
Therefore, a more pragmatic philosophy of copyright requires
that authors and artists be rewarded for sticking with their chosen profession. The preferred alternative is to let the marketplace determine
which of the pugnacious creators should be rewarded. 20 6 As a result,
copyright must protect economic incentives for authors without regard to the theoretical social utility of a particular work. 20 7
2.

PromotingProgress Through the Public Domain

Congress exercises its authority and obligation to promote progress not merely by providing copyright owners with exclusive rights,
but by generally shaping the marketplace for copyrighted works. This
201
See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), 1710 http://www.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Statute-of-Anne (last visited Apr. 21, 2003).
202 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 673 (1834).
203 See Chartier, supra note 29, at 14 ("In France, the decree of the King's Council of
August 1777 implicitly linked the perpetuity of the privileges accorded to authors and the
specificity of their 'labour."').
204 Copyright Law Revision, 1965: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965), reprinted in 8
GEORGE S. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 65 (2d ed. 2001)

(statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights: "The basic purpose of copyright protection is the public interest, to make sure that the wellsprings of creation do not
dry up through lack of incentive, and to provide an alternative to the evils of an authorship
dependent upon private or public patronage.").
205 See Gifford, supra note 196, at 586-87 ("[P]atronage remained the principal economic base for the arts from the Renaissance through the nineteenth century.
206 See id. at 588-90.
207 Other reward systems are used in addition to the marketplace. Research is subsidized though academic institutions. Similarly, classical music, dance, theatre, and other
art forms are supported through tax exempt charitable centers. Finally, some works are
supported by the government through the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities, as well as through similar state organizations. See
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is Congress's inherent task in managing copyright policy. "It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired."2 0 8 To effectuate marketplace management, Congress
must recognize the sometimes conflicting needs of existing authors,
future authors, publishers, and the general public. 21 9 Congress has
been engaged in this task throughout the history of copyright, as the
1909 Act legislative hearings make clear:
"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider... two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer
and so benefit the public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a
benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary
2 01
monopoly."
In the debate over the evolution of copyright law and the correct
fulcrum for the balance, one of the key issues has been the role of the
public domain. 211 Professor Jaszi captures the essence of the public

domain well by describing it as "the priceless repository of works that
are ineligible for copyright, were created before copyright law existed,
have had their copyrights expire, or have been freely given to the pub-

lic by their authors." 2 12 This priceless repository is of significant value
to the public because it enables many works, such as the King James

213
Bible, to be made available for less cost.
Elimination of royalties, however, is only one of the important
aspects of the public domain's priceless role. A second, largely ig-

nored role of the public domain is freeing a work from its attributive
rights. 2 14 Simply put, contractual licensing arrangements for some
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 113, 124-25 (1999) ("[G]ranting property rights to original creators allows them to prevent subsequent creators from building on their works, which
means that a law designed to encourage the creation of first-generation works may actually
risk stifling second-generation creative works."); cf Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success Vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741,
747-48 (2001) (discussing the effects of the combination of copyright, common law, and
technological self-help).
210
Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.10 (citing H.R. REP. No. 2222-60, at 7 (1909)).
211
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 364-65 (1996) (describing a digital public square).
212
Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of Law Libraries et al. at 4, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618), available at http://www.arl.org/info/frn/
copy/ashcroft.pdf.
213
See Roger Syn, © Copyright God: Enforcement of Copyright in the Bible and Religious
208
209

Works, 14

REGENT

U. L.

REv.

1, 2-3 (2001-2002).

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 804-05 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing costs and impediments caused by the "'permissions"' requirement).
214
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works develop into an intractable morass of ownership interests and
licensing obligations. 2 15 For works that have fallen prey to intricate
licensing arrangements, ownership bankruptcies, and other fissures in
the chain of copyright title, the public domain provides the freedom
for any publisher or exhibitor to reintroduce the work. Once a work
can no longer benefit its owners because of unsolvable ownership
problems, it may as well benefit the public through its general availability in the public domain. Once the legal costs associated with curing the problems with copyright title exceed the value of work when
exploited, it will cease to be publicly available. Such works only
reemerge for new uses once they fall into the public domain.
The third role of the public domain is to serve as the creative grist
for the new authorial mill. Popular culture often works best by recasting accepted truths in a new light. 2 16 Just as Shakespeare built many

of his fictional works on the well-known stories of Plutarch, modern
playwrights and filmmakers build their works on his.2 1 7 While fair use

allows for limited comment, criticism, and creative allusion to existing
copyrighted works, only works in the public domain can be freely
adapted, revised, and retold. The repeated return to this public well
has a profound effect on society, creating a "lingua culture," which
serves to create a social bond throughout society. This recasting function of the public domain also serves a central purpose: "[B]y limiting
the scope of [copyright's] proprietary entitlement, copyright constrains owner control over expression, seeking to preserve rich possibilities for critical exchange and diverse reformulation of existing
works."2 18 The reformulation central to this role can only occur when
all copyright ownership ties have been cut off.
The recasting is often in part rather than in whole. Music, clips,
photographs, characters, poetry, and other building blocks of larger
copyrighted works can be manipulated by newer authors as part of the
ongoing creative process. Without these building blocks, the barriers
to entry in the creative marketplace become much higher. To the
extent that only some authors have the financial ability to license
these building blocks, the actual and transaction costs of licensing disproportionately disadvantage those artists without funds and access to
legal services.2 19 To put the point more bluntly, African American
SeeJon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 491, 520 (1999).
216
See Lemley, supra note 209, at 124-26.
217
For example, the musical Kiss Me Kate is a retelling of Taming of the Shrew, Boys from
Syracuse is a retelling of Comedy of Errors (which was itself a retelling of Plutarch's The Twin
Mechmi), and West Side Story derives from Romeo &Juliet.
218
Netanel, supra note 211, at 347.
219
See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 356 (1999).
215

the Marketplace of Ideas, 17
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artists may find that a shrinking public domain reduces access to
works and perpetuates the racial bias inherent in the commercial licensing transactions rampant throughout the early growth of the entertainment industries. 220 Thus, a subtle but insidious side effect of
the dwindling public domain is to reinforce the status quo in the development of new schools of expression, art, media, and other
22 1
works.
The public domain also exemplifies the purest form of public
goods works in copyright. Without any legal constraints, the inherently nonrivalrous nature of all copyrights combines with its nonexclusivity through low marginal costs of copying or free receipt of
broadcast works to model perfectly public goods. 222 Despite this public goods nature, however, technology and contract law can combine
to reestablish exclusivity.
Perhaps the greatest blow to the perceived equity of copyright law
has been the use of consumer contracts to reshape the public domain.
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,223 the Seventh Circuit established the proposition that shrinkwrap agreements are binding to limit a consumer's right to extract public domain data from a computer CD or
waive other significant rights. 22 4 Since then, other courts have strug-

gled to address the proper place for such contracts. 225 Shrinkwrap
contracts do not reflect careful congressional balancing but rather il220

See id. at 356-57.
In practice, Blacks as a class received less protection for artistic musical
works due to (1) inequalities of bargaining power (2) the clash between the
structural elements of copyright law and the oral predicate of Black culture,
and (3) broad and pervasive social discrimination which both devalued
Black contributions to the arts and created greater vulnerability to exploitation and appropriation of creative works.

Id.
221
The economic consequences caused by the costs of licensing may closely correlate
with issues of race and culture. To the extent that the minority communities are less affluent and have been traditionally underserved by the legal community, the artists struggling
to emerge within these communities have fewer licensed component elements with which
to create their works. This concern has multiple parts. For example, increasing evidence
that racial minorities have less access to computers, the Internet, and other technologies
has fueled fears that minority communities will be on the wrong side of a growing "digital
divide." SeeJerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2000) ("Many worry that
racial minorities will be left behind in the technological backwater.").
222
A nonrivalrous good is one which a person can possess and enjoy without precluding or interfering with the identical possession and enjoyment by another person. A
nonexclusive good is one from the consumption of which potential consumers cannot be
excluded. See Adam R. Fox, The Economics of Expression and the Future of Copyright Law, 25
OHio N.U. L. REv. 5, 10 (1999).
223
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
224
Id. at 1449.
225
Compare Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. Mass. 2003) (following ProCD to enforce a shrinkwrap license) with Specht v. Netscape Communications
Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (disallowing a clickwrap agreement used to compel arbitration). Cf Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding
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lustrate the ability to alter fundamentally the manner of copyright delivery by combining changes in both law and technology. The CD
producer can foreclose all access to formulae and processes embedded in its content while contractually precluding fair use or use of
226
facts and public domain materials.
So long as significant legal rights can be waived in non-negotiable, mass-market transactions,227 critics will consider the balance between copyright holders and the public to be heavily tipped towards
the copyright holders. 228 The irony here is that these materials may
not necessarily have anything to do with the previous copyright owners of the public domain works, or the industrious discoverers of the
facts. Instead, the power of shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements is
to vest control of the product in the packager of the content. According to the logic of ProCD, any DVD distributor with access to public
domain motion picture masters could use these contracts to control
229
copying of the DVD.

The potential for contract law to close the public domain is far
greater than the potential for copyright to do the same. 230 It also
that the terms of a shrinkwrap license are not incorporated into the terms of a purchase
agreement).
Compare ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449 (foreclosing access to formulates and processes
226
through a shrinkwrap) with 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1999) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
227 Mass-market consumer transactions differ from negotiated contracts among participants of roughly equal bargaining power. Particularly during those stages prior to the
public distribution of a product, protection of trade secrets and other confidential information may be critical to its development, but such protection is less compelling and outweighed by the value of public dissemination once the work has been completed and
generally published to the public. See Ryan J. Casamiquela, ContractualAssent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475 (2002).
228
See id. at 492 ("Because producers use shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses in mass-

market transactions, courts would be giving producers the opportunity to re-write copyright law if federal law did not preempt private contracts.") (footnotes omitted); Garon,
supra note 215, at 550 ("'Properly' drafted, the clickwrap license will cover every instance
of the software's use. For all practical purposes, such a construction of the shrinkwrap
provisions could effectively end the right to the public domain for material that is commercially sold.").
229 See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contractand Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1111 (1998). Although not presently used in the marketplace, DVD
players incorporate a menu system that could readily be used to require a click-through
license of the type upheld in ProCD. Shrinkwrap licenses which incorporate a manifestation of assent demonstrated by the opening of the packaging can be applied to any product and are not legally restricted to software. Presumably, public pressure has stemmed the
expansion of this form of contract creation.
230 This concern is exacerbated by the proposed development of the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA), formerly known as draft Article 2B to the
Uniform Commercial Code. UCITA specifically validates such shrinkwrap and clickwrap
agreements without providing safeguards to protect public interests from overreaching in
areas such as reverse engineering, public domain access, and fair use. SeeJames S. Heller,
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reaches beyond the public domain to facts and ideas that share many
of the attributes of public domain materials, but were never before
limited from public consumption. 31 Facts, formulae, ideas, and other
works outside of copyright may still be contractually bound up in
23 2
shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements.
Unfortunately, the impact of shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements has left a strong distaste in the public's mouth, rendering dislike of the modern law's application to free information and the
public domain undifferentiated between copyright and contract
law. 233 In the context of mass-market consumer transactions, ProCD

and its progeny change the legal balance and the social relationship
between the law and the public, adopting an absolutist approach in
favor of the content distributor.
The decision vests legal control over copyright policy in the content packager's private hands and undermines the consumer's respect
for equitable contracts and meaningful assent. 234 Because it is ethically inconsistent with legal notions of fair play, ProCD represents an
example of the law overasserting the rights of a party so blatantly that
any enforcement impugns the validity of law itself. 235 The ProCDdeci-

sion is so far outside the normative acceptance of copyright that it is
untied from its ethical and normative moorings.
A similar, but seldom discussed phenomenon, occurs with public
domain materials donated to libraries and museums. As part of the
donation agreement, the donor may impose significant restrictions on
the institution. In Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,2 36 the libraries provided the improperly published letters to Ian Hamilton, the infringing
biographer, as part of the research he conducted at Harvard,
Princeton, and the University of Texas. 237 These institutions had restrictions typical of the use restrictions imposed on libraries and uniUCITA: Still Crazy After All These Years, and Still Not Ready for Prime Time, 8 RiCH. J.L. &
TECH. 5, 55-56 (2001), at http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v8il/article5.html; Pamela
Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE
L.J. 1575, 1626-27 (2002).
231
See, e.g., Madison, supra note 229, at 1029; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447.
232 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447.
233 Madison, supra note 229, at 1029 ("[B]y affirming and proclaiming the validity of
shrinkwrap practice, ProCDencourages norms of information use that depress the development of a coherent understanding of what I call 'open space.' Open space is shorthand
for the combination of material and information that lies in the public domain and the fair
use of copyrighted works.").
234 Heller, supra note 230, at 58.
235 As applied to public domain content, facts, underlying ideas, fair use research or
criticism, and other types of content use, the clickwrap structure suggests a form of practice closer to copyright misuse or illegal tying arrangements than to bona fide commercial
transactions.
236 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
237

Id. at 93.
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works

unavailable for republication or for other, non-archival uses. 238 Lan-

guage quoted from such contracts, such as the Princeton agreement
"not to copy, reproduce, circulate or publish" material available in the
collection, goes much further than does copyright law. 23 9 In the wake

of ProCDand the current trend to immunize contract law from copyright limitations, these provisions may well prove to reduce the public
domain more directly than congressional legislation on copyright
policy.
3.

The Power of Congress to Play Favorites

Although Congress has the power to adjust the balance of copyright policy among its various constituencies, it does not necessarily
seek to maximize the copyright owner's economic return. 240 More
often than not, Congress provides less copyright protection than that
which economic analyses suggest is optimal. 24' "Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and
' 242
copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly."
When Congress limits copyright, it serves to promote some public
interest other than economic reward for the author. If the power to
promote progress provides noneconomic incentives as well as economic incentives, then Congress should have the ability to achieve this
goal through economically inefficient limitations on, as well as economically sound expansions of, copyright. Section 110 of the Copy24 3
right Act codifies many noneconomic limitations.
238

See id. As the Salinger court explained:
Ian Hamilton located most, if not all, of the letters in the libraries of
Harvard, Princeton, and the University of Texas, to which they had been
donated by the recipients or their representatives. Prior to examining the
letters at the university libraries, Hamilton signed form agreements furnished by the libraries, restricting the use he could make of the letters without permission of the library and the owner of the literary property rights.
The Harvard form required permission "to publish the contents of the
manuscript or any excerpt therefrom." The Princeton form obliged the
signer "not to copy, reproduce, circulate or publish" inspected manuscripts
without permission.

Id.
239

Id.

240

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 ("As the text

of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining
the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in
order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.").
241
See id.
242

Id.

243

See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2000).
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Section 110 provides examples of balancing that are clearly intended to promote public interests at the expense of authors and artists. For example, the public performance and display of a work
shown as part of face-to-face education illustrates Congress's desire
that schools be relieved of the expense of purchasing the rights to
show copies in the classroom. 244 Congress has a similar policy to protect churches from having to pay performance fees. 245 These provisions of the law limit the scope of the copyright holder's interest. In
real property language, these § 110 provisions create an easement
over the copyright owner's interest. In tort terms, these provisions
24
provide limited immunity from suit.

The property shifting conducted by Congress in these instances
has little to do with economics; rather, congressional exemptions may
reflect the societal dislike of tort claims, which waste the assets of charitable organizations. In this area, Congress continues to extend the
24 7
limited immunity it has long recognized.
Perhaps the best example of this noneconomic balance is
§ 110(4).248 This cumbersome provision permits public performances
of copyrighted works, so long as the performances are provided by
244 See id. § 110(1 );Jon Garon, The Electronicjungle: The Application of Intellectual Property
Law to Distance Education, 4 VAND. J. Er. L. & PRAc. 146, 156-57 (2002) (discussing the
classroom performance exceptions to public performance risks as applied to classroom
and distance education).
245
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3). Cf Syn, supra note 213, at 10-15 (reviewing the lack of
copyright protection for the King James Bible in the United Kingdom). Whether the religious accommodation of § 110 would survive constitutional challenge remains an interesting but untested question. The statute is not neutral toward religion, but rather is
directly singling out religious content ("a dramatico-musical work of a religious nature")
for less protection than other forms of dranmatico-musical works and religious services and
assemblies for benefits not afforded to other public gatherings. As such, the law is not
neutral, therefore failing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1971). Selectively stripping the copyright owner of the power to protect the property interest in this one instance
may also violate the right not to be compelled to speak. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). Unlike fair use, which requires the amount taken to be
appropriate and the usage to be limited to the types of fair uses recognized by courts and
the statute, § 110(3) has no such limitation. On the other hand, the performance must be
substantially accurate. If there is significant alteration of the script that would most likely
be considered the creation of a derivative work, it is an exclusive right not covered by the
statute.
246
The tort analogy may be more appropriate. Sovereign immunity would have
reached state schools and colleges, unless waived. Similarly, many states recognized charitable immunity at one time to protect nonprofit organizations such as schools and
churches from tort liability. Congress's choice of exemptions may reflect the societal dislike of tort claims wasting the assets of such charitable activities. See also 17 U.S.C. § 121
(1999) (exempting from copyright protection works created for use by "blind people and
other people with disabilities").
247
These provisions all predate the 1976 Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1909)
(repealed 1978). The 1909 Act included a specific requirement that public performances
were "for profit" rather than exempting specific nonprofit activities. Id.
248
17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2000).
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volunteers, 249 and there is either no admission charge or the charges
inure to a bona fide, tax exempt purpose. 25° Such use, however, can
be precluded if the copyright owner timely objects to the use of the
copyrighted work. 25 1 The statute does not actually shift the statutory
"property" rights of the author, although it does change the tort presumptions. Further, its notice provision shifts the informational and
enforcement burden under the statute. Congress has shifted the duty
to police the marketplace from the consumer to the copyright owner
for those nonprofit performances staged without charging admission
252
It
fees or put on for the benefit of nonprofit, tax exempt activities.
has also dramatically truncated the timeframe of enforcement, from
three years following infringement 253 to one week prior to infringement. 254 Thus, a copyright owner cannot take timely steps to block
infringement performances unless the copyright somehow encounters
advance marketing materials or otherwise learns of the performance.
The shift acknowledges that the real issue in many of these situations is not the economics of copyright, but the transaction costs associated with permission and enforcement. 255 If a nonprofit must ask
permission to use copyrighted material, the costs and burdens of finding the copyright holder, the time delay involved in asking permission, and the fear of rejection will generally outweigh the benefits of
seeking a license, even if the license itself is without cost. 256 Under
§ 110(4)(B), the copyright owner has the same power to accept or
reject the performance as before. However, she bears the costs and
25 7
burdens of finding the nonprofit and making a timely objection.
The net effect is to make the nonprofit performances far easier to
conduct without technically stripping the copyright owner of any
property or economic interests.
Where for-profit activities are involved, Landes and Posner recommend construing fair use narrowly so that performing rights societies such as the American Society for Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) and similar "innovative market mechanisms that
249
Id. (requiring no payment to "performance promoters or organizers"). More accurately, the protection is limited to volunteers, but the meaning is to protect amateur, unpaid performances. Professional volunteers are also permitted so long as other conditions
of the statute are met.
250

Id.

251

Id. § 110(4) (B).

252

See id.

253 See id. § 507(b) (2000).
254 See id.§ 110(4) (B).
255 See David H. Kramer, Note, Who Can Use Yesterday's News?: Video Monitoring and the
Fair Use Doctrine, 81 GEO. L.J. 2345, 2353-54 (1993).
256 See id.at 2354.
257 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
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reduce transactions costs" continue to develop. 258 One could speculate that Congress may be concerned that the limited benefit of these
performing rights society licenses and the impracticality of licensing
nonmusical works would result in underutilization of the copyrighted
works, increased violations of copyright law, and little benefit to the
copyright owners. In this situation, both the economic and progress
rationales support an extension of the exception to copyright. The
theoretical power to stop these performances is a nod to the natural
rights interests, though it hardly provides meaningful protection in
most instances.
These three different approaches diverge most dramatically in
their treatment of the next exemption in § 110 of the Copyright Act.
Section 110(5) exempts retail businesses and restaurants from copyright owners' exclusive rights to public performances of their works
under certain situations. 259 To be eligible for the exemption, the
store or restaurant must only be playing a television or radio program
that is otherwise licensed for broadcast and meet some combination
of equipment and space limitations. 260
258
259
260

Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 358.
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
See id. The Act states:
§ 110. Limitations on exclusive rights: Exemption of certain performances and displays ...
(5) (A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of
a kind commonly used in private homes, unless (i) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(ii) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public;
(B) communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public, originated
by a radio or television broadcast station licensed as such by the
Federal Communications Commission, or, if an audiovisual transmission, by a cable system or satellite carrier, if(i) in the case of an establishment other than a food service or
drinking establishment, either the establishment in which the
communication occurs has less than 2,000 gross square feet of
space (excluding space used for customer parking and for no
other purpose), or the establishment in which the communication occurs has 2,000 or more gross square feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other
purpose) and(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is communicated by means of a total of not more
than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor
space; or
(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any
visual portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 4 audiovisual
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Unlike the previously discussed exemptions in § 110, § 110(5) is
not limited to charitable activities, nor does it suffer from significant
transaction costs because the performing rights societies are already
successfully licensing similar establishments which fall outside the fair
use safe harbor created by the equipment and square footage provisions of the law.2 6 1 Instead, Congress intended that this provision pro-

vide economic relief to small businesses and restaurateurs from the
payment demands of the copyright owners represented by the per262
forming rights societies.
From a natural rights perspective, such congressional balancing is
unfathomable because it directly interferes with the power, vested immutably with the author, to control the nature of her work. Although
such a position ignores the practical reality that the author ceded control to the broadcasting company, which transmitted the program to
each store or restaurant, it still interferes with this right. In fact, ab-

(ii)

(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Id.
261
262

devices, of which not more than 1 audiovisual device is
located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device has
a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6
loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are
located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;
in the case of a food service or drinking establishment, either
the establishment in which the communication occurs has less
than 3,750 gross square feet of space (excluding space used
for customer parking and for no other purpose), or the establishment in which the communication occurs has 3,750 gross
square feet of space or more (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose) and(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is communicated by means of a total of not more
than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor
space; or
(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any
visual portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 4 audiovisual
devices, of which not more than one audiovisual device is
located in any I room, and no such audiovisual device has
a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6
loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are
located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;
no direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission or
retransmission;
the transmission or retransmission is not further transmitted
beyond the establishment where it is received; and
the transmission or retransmission is licensed by the copyright
owner of the work so publicly performed or displayed . ..

See id. § 110.
See Garon, supra note 215, at 526-27.
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sent this congressional action, it was possible for copyright owners,
such as the National Basketball Association or National Football
League, to seek legal remedy against stores and restaurants that were
publicly broadcasting their games without league consent. Nothing
inherent in the balancing of natural rights suggests that the right
could be limited for the convenience of shopkeepers.
Similarly, from a purely economic perspective, Landes and Posner explicitly address the issues regarding the availability of the blanket licenses to broadcasters and state that the role of the performing
rights societies provides adequate efficiency so that a fair use provision
is unnecessary for the small business owner. 263 Simply put, the transaction costs involved do not provide the basis for denying copyright
protection. 264 Further, although not discussed in this instance by
Landes and Posner, the small business trade associations provide a
potential vehicle for private negotiations. 265 In this regard, even the
fear that some copyright owners would refuse to license could have
been addressed. If a trade association for all restaurants and sports
bars entered into a blanket licensing agreement, then it could have
assured every bar in the country that by payment of its required fee,
the copyright owners could not single out one bar for refusal to negotiate. As a result, there was no strong economic argument to provide
for protectionist legislation.
This legislation can only be justified from the progress perspective. Congress presumably reasoned that the copyright owners would
do far more harm to themselves by negotiating with restaurants and
shopkeepers. Although copyright owners had an economic and natural interest in the works available in the stores and restaurants, their
interest was subservient to the interests of the stores and restaurants in
being absolved from royalty payments. Some commentators have argued that the codification of the copyright exemptions in § 110 simply
prevented a greedy industry from alienating its core audience, while
others have suggested that the legislature merely valued the interests
of the restaurant lobby more than those of the copyright lobby. In
any case, Congress evidently determined that allowing private negotiations for these licenses did not further progress.
This legislation sends a strong signal that Congress has the legislative authority to tip the balance in favor of copyright owners or towards the public on a case-by-case basis. Except for possible

263

See Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 358.

264 See id.
265 See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructurefor Rights Management Systems, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 41, 50-51 (2001).
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constitutional limitations, 2 66 Congress can shape the balance across a
wide spectrum of issues. In any given debate, economic efficiency
may or may not be among the concerns Congress chooses to address.
III
PUBLIC GOODS

AND

WHAT Is GOOD FOR THE PUBLIC

The nature of intellectual property requires congressional balancing between copyright holders' interests and other societal interests. Economic considerations, promotion of progress in other forms,
and the natural rights of authors may set parameters for a debate on
optimal balancing. The intangible nature of the property makes
rules, rather than mere possession, the primary mechanism for this
shift in interests, but as described in Parts I and II, none of these theories individually serve to explain or predict the nature of copyright or
help identify the normative and ethical underpinnings which shape
cultural acceptance of copyright norms. While each copyright theory
describes a part of copyright, only copyright's perceived status as a
public good fully frames the modern debate.
The conception of public goods and ideas as nonrivalous and
nonexclusive 26 7 echoes the words of Thomas Jefferson: "'He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening
mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."' 268 The concept of public goods is consistent with Roman
property models. Air, sea, and free-flowing water are nonrivalous in
that no user generally reduces the enjoyment of others. 269 None of
27
these types of property can be held exclusively. 11
Those properties which are both nonrivalous and nonexclusive
can be diminished by no one and therefore society does not respect
any claims of ownership. Regardless of legal construct, social justice
dictates that public goods are not subject to ownership and control.

266
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality
of the copyright term extension).
267
See WA-rr, supra note 78, at 3 ("A public good is [characterized] by admitting more
than one user, with no user's consumption requiring any less consumption by any other
user."); Fox, supra note 222, at 10.
268
Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON,

supra note 49, at 180-81).

SeeYen, supra note 79, at 522. The potential for pollution provides a limiting value
on natural public goods. Overuse may diminish the value of the air, sea, or water, but it
does not diminish the relative interests of one individual over another.
270
Id. Of course the coastline can be held exclusively, so that access to the public
good may be privately controlled.
269
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Misconceptions of Copyright as a Public Good
Landes and Posner suggest that intellectual property is a public

27 1
good because of its delivery aspects.

While the cost of creating a work subject to copyright protectionfor example, a book, movie, song, ballet, lithograph, map, business
directory, or computer software program-is often high, the cost of
reproducing the work, whether by the creator or by those to whom
he has made it available, is often low. And once copies are available
to others, it is often inexpensive for these users to make additional
copies.

2 72

A perfect model for public goods is the over-the-air broadcasting
of radio and television signals. Reception of AM, FM and broadcast
television is nonrivalous. The addition of more television sets and radio receivers does not diminish the broadcast signal in any manner.
The broadcasters also recognize that the signal is nonexclusive, meaning that the broadcaster has only general control over the ability to
select signal recipients. 273 As a result, over-the-air broadcasting is a
public good.
The problem with this description of over-the-air broadcasting is
that it suggests that radio and television programming-the content
being distributed-is a public good as well. The public good nature
of the distribution model does not transform the underlying work's
property attributes. Traditionally, people treated the delivery of some
copyrighted works such as books and phonorecords as public goods
because the manufacturing costs were low while the development
costs were high.2 7 4 These were not true public goods, since each copy

of the work was exclusive, but they approximated public goods because of the ability of either the copyright owner or the pirate to inexpensively expand the number of copies. Each additional copy does
have some costs, however, and legal regimes such as copyright retain
the exclusivity to stop pirates and keep the copyrighted works from
becoming public goods. Unlike over-the-air broadcasting, newspapers, CDs, and other distribution methods are not truly public goods.
Similarly, live indoor public performances in movie theaters and
stage theatres are exclusive because each seat for the performance is
sold individually. As a result, indoor public performances of copyrighted works have never been public goods. Nonetheless, the preemSee Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326.
271
272 Id. With the use of peer-to-peer networks and other computer wonders, the costs
of reproduction have dropped from low to virtually zero. There is an overhead cost for the
purchase of the computer, but it need be taken into account only if the consumer purchased the computer exclusively for the reproduction of copyrighted works.
273
The broadcasters may have a limited ability to control the outlaying audience by
choice of signal strength and through placement of the transmitting tower.
274 See Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326.
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inence of over-the-air broadcasting as an entertainment and
communications medium has influenced the public's perception that
copyright protects public goods.
1.

The Television Cases

The television cases illustrate how technological advances require
economic and normative models to differentiate between the delivery
mechanism and the underlying interest. In the early cases of Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 275 and Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.276 the Court was swayed, at least in part, by

the public good nature of the delivery mechanism-television.
2 77
In Fortnightly, a local community antenna television (CATV)
system retransmitted broadcast signals from the local over-the-air
broadcasters to subscribers' homes using coaxial cable. 278 United Artists sued, claiming that the rebroadcasts of its copyrighted motion pictures to Fortnightly's paying subscribers was a public performance
engaged in for profit by the CATV system. 279 The Court refused to
find liability, explaining that "a CATV system no more than enhances
the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals.... It is true
that a CATV system plays an 'active' role in making reception possible
in a given area, but so do ordinary television sets and antennas."' 280 By
providing to the broadcaster's public the same content as that delivered through a similar vehicle, the Court found that no performance
had taken place. 28 ' This was heavily disputed by the dissent, which
pointed out that more than forty years of case law supported the notion that retransmission was a public performance. 282 The dissent
cited Buck v. Jezell-LaSalle Realty Corp.,28 3 which the majority limited to
its facts.2 8 4 The significant distinction, according to the majority opin275 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see alsoTeleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (ruling that regulation of the communications industry must be left to Congress).
276
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
277
This was the precursor of modern cable broadcasting.
278
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 391-93.
279
Id. at 395. See 17 U.S.C. § 1(c)(superseded) (providing for the copyright owner's
exclusive right to "perform ... in public for profit").
280
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399.
281
See id. at 400-02.
282
See id. at 405 (Fortas,J.,dissenting).
283
283 U.S. 191 (1931).
284
See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396 n.18.
But in Jewell-LaSalle, a hotel received on a master radio set an unauthorized
broadcast of a copyrighted work and transmitted that broadcast to all the
public and private rooms of the hotel by means of speakers installed by the
hotel in each room. The Court held the hotel liable for infringement[,] but
noted that the result might have differed if, as in this case, the original
broadcast had been authorized by the copyright holder. The JeweUt-LaSale
decision must be understood as limited to its own facts.
Id. (citations omitted).
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ion, was that the original broadcast had been unauthorized, suggesting that had the original broadcast been a lawful one,
rebroadcasting the signals to the public in the nonexclusive audience
could not be a copyright violation. 28 5 The outcome in Fortnightly is
inconsistent with most, if not all case law addressing public performance, because the unauthorized person has no legal right to expand,
enhance, modify, or alter the public performance offered by the copyright owner, even if the target audience would not otherwise have
28
changed. "
Although the Court never discussed the public good nature of
the broadcast, it strongly suggested that if a member of the public has
access to a signal, then the intermediate actions to provide that same
signal cannot violate the copyright owner's interest, even when conducted by an unauthorized third party. 2, 7 The result can best be ex-

plained as reflecting the understanding that a broadcast is essentially a
public good, for which no copyright injury can be compensated by a
court.

Such an approach is also consistent with the awkward decision
announced by the Court in Sony.288 The Sony Court, in discussing
whether the unauthorized, temporary copying of broadcast programming, known as time-shifting, could be deemed a fair use, invoked a
variation of the public goods analysis:
Theft of a particular item of personal property of course may have
commercial significance, for the thief deprives the owner of his
right to sell that particular item to any individual. Time-shifting
does not even remotely entail comparable consequences to the copyright owner. Moreover, the time-shifter no more steals the program by watching it once than does the live viewer, and the live
viewer is no more likely to buy prerecorded videotapes than is the
time-shifter. Indeed, no live viewer would buy a prerecorded videotape if he did not have access to a VTR.'11"
285
286

See id.
See, e.g., NFL v. Primetime 24Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 941 (2001) (discussing interception of a broadcast signal); Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v, Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing rental of viewing room
and video cassettes); Columbia Pictures Indius., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d
Cir. 1984) (discussing rental of viewing booths); Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys.,
Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808 (D. Minn. 1984), affd, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing
retransmission by cable system); WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d
622 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing retransmission of a television program by cable system).
287 See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 397-401.
288
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTNNBERG -1-0 TIE CA.ESTIAL
JUKE BOX 149-58 (1994) (detailing reversal of majority of court from a finding of infringement to a finding of fair use);JAMEs LARDNER, FAsT FORWARO: A MAcHINE AND THE. COMMO"riON IT CAUSED (2d ed. 2002).
289 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33 (1984).
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The public goods approach to time-shifting was a central part of
the thin majority's analysis.29 ' According to the evidence relied upon
by the Court, time-shifting accounted for as much as 96% of the
Betamax use, according to defendants, and at least 75.4% according
to plaintiffs' evidence. 29' Attorneys presented no significant evidence
providing a percentage balance between authorized and unauthorized time-shifting, though some anecdotal evidence suggested that
20% to 58% would have been authorized, at least in part.2

92

As a re-

sult, the fair use determination was critical to the outcome that Sony
was not contributorily liable for the unauthorized time shifting of its
consumers.2 93 Had the Court found unauthorized time-shifting infringement, it would have had a much more difficult time determining that the Betamax machine was non-infringing. The explanation
that time-shifting was not comparable to the theft of property undermined the important fair use factors, enabling the Court to find fair
294
use for Sony.

If copyrighted works are public goods, it stands to reason that
they can be treated as nonrivalous and nonexclusive by both the copyright owner and the copyright consumers. After all, retransmission of
a broadcast signal can cause no harm if the copyright owner was
broadcasting the signal to that area anyway, and time-shifting only increases the potential viewing audience. Put another way, the logical
assumption is that copying a nonrivalous, nonexclusive work can
cause no harm since the copied work is, by definition, already fully
available to every potential audience member in a manner that does
not diminish the value to either the copyright holder or the consumers of the work. The problem with this logical extension of the public
goods approach to copyrighted works is that the copyrighted works
are not public goods-only select delivery mechanisms are.
The role of the Sony decision was to further conflate delivery
mechanisms with the underlying copyrighted works. Whether or not
the controversial Sony decision was initially correct, it has been widely
accepted, coming to represent the popular understanding of home
taping. As such, the Court established a normative balance between
the consumer's interest and the copyright owner's expectation by differentiating between time-shifting and librarying.
The Court endorsed the district court's finding that "the timeshifting without librarying would result in 'not a great deal of
290
291
292
293
294

See
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id.
id. at
id. at

442-47, 456.
424 n.4.
442.
450 (comparing infringement to jewelry theft).
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harm.' ,,29 5 As a result, Sony has established an acceptable norm for
home copying. The distinction between time-shifting and librarying is

a legal nicety that has been beyond the copyright owner's ability to
challenge-or stomach. Although not documented, this was not unexpected. During the trial, Universal cautioned about the long term
consequences of this new norm. 29 6 As the district court phrased it,
"[p]laintiffs' greatest concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of
important philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.'
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible boundaries' are
21 7
passed: 'the copyright owner has lost control over his program.' '
2.

Losing Control, Gaining Technology

Universal's fear that the philosophy of home taping would
change the public's relationship with copyright owners has come to
fruition. The public goods attributes of ideas and broadcasting have
been extended in the public's mind to copyrighted works more generally. Steward Brand's empathic declaration that "[i] nformation wants
to be free" elevated the public goods imprimatur of copyright law into
a philosophical agenda in 1987.29 8 This burgeoning approach exploded with the allegedly unregtilable Internet that developed thereafter.2 9" The very phrase "information wants to be free" suggests that
information is presently imprisoned, both in its physical trappings of
books, celluloid, and polymer as well as legally imprisoned in copy3
right's ever expanding straightjacket. 00
295

Id. at 451 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Snpp.

429, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1979)).
296

See id.

Id.
Marci A. Hamilton, The Distant Drumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the Information
Era, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & EN'r. L.J. 259, 260 (2002) (quoting Stewart Brand, Findinga Balance in the Sli)eiy Economics of an InformationAge: Depending on Your Perspective, Data'sFreeor Priceless, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1987, at C3).
299 See id.
This mesmerizing, utopian call [Brand's statement] has had a powerful impact, leading otherwise law-abiding citizens to declare that copyright lawthe hackers' most hated legal regime-was dead, that national boundaries
are ephemeral, and that privacy was impossible. They have treated the collection of new technologies we have dubbed an "era" as the path to democracy, the path to free creative products, and the path to radical
egalitarianism.
Id.
:0o0 See id. Hamilton frames the anarchistic approach as follows:
The hackers who initiated the Information Era have touted an anti-government, anti-law, and anti-big business mentality that challenges the fundamentals of the modern legal, creative culture. The fertile ground of their
radical posture has generated arguments against any regulation of the Web
(even including child pornography regulations), arguments against sales
taxes on the Web as though sales that happen to occur via the Web are
categorically different from other types of sales, and, most vociferously of
all, arguments that copyright laws are simply obsolete.
297
298
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The effect of the marriage between the free information anthem
and the unbridled expansion of the Internet has been to transform
the norm of copyright protection for many consumers, particularly
the teens and younger adults who developed their ethical standards
during the "irrational exuberance" of the new economy's early
1
days.3
Ironically, the very same technology that has made this philosophical transformation possible also provides a mechanism for effectively removing most copyrighted works from the delivery
impediments that make broadcasting a public good. For example, the
television industry has witnessed a significant market share shift from
over-the-air broadcasters to cable systems-the very market first protected by the Court in Fortnightly. For the first time, a premier cable
television show, "The Sopranos," had the highest weekly rating of any
2
television show among the key 18 to 49 age demographic.311
The success of the individual show with an audience in which
each household pays for both cable service and the premium HBO
programming undercuts the public good nature of broadcasting. The
popularity of "The Sopranos" is part of an ongoing larger trend. "The
challenges to the [broadcast television] industry's future remain intense. [April 2001] marked a negative milestone, when more than
half of all homes watching TV in prime time were watching basic
cable-the first time that had ever happened during an entire month
of a regular broadcast season ....

11-003

The changing power of the marketplace between cable and
broadcast television suggests that there is nothing inherent in the delivery mechanisms indicating whether a copyrighted work is a public
good or property subject to commercial sales .3

4

Television can be

delivered as a public good, as a subscription, or as an individual episode through pay-per-view. 3 5 The copyrighted work does not change
Id.
301
Cf. Francis G. Conrad, Dot.Corns in Bankruptcy Valuations Under Title 11 or
www.Snipehunt in the Dark.noreorg/noassets.com,9 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 417, 428 & n.52
(2001) (quoting Federal Reserve Chairmkn Alan Greenspan and noting his prescient take
on the Internet stock pricing bubble in December 1996).
302
SeeJosefAdalian, Bada Bing Stings Networks, VARIETY, Sept. 23-29, 2002, at 17 ("Even
though HBO reaches fewer than one-third of the nation's TV homes, more than 13 million
viewers tuned in for the return of Tony Soprano and his clan. Among the advertiserfriendly adults 18-49 demo, the show was the No. 1 rated program of the week.").
303
Jim Rutenberg, Cable Thrives, but Broadcast TVIs Hardly Extinct, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2002, at C1 (citing Nielsen Media Research).
304
See, e.g., U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (describing premium scrambling technology and finding existing technology sufficiently exclusive as to
preclude additional regulation necessary to protect minors from signal leakage of adultoriented content).
-305
See id. at 806 ("Cable operators used scrambling in the regular course of business,
so that only paying customers had access to certain programs.").
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despite the change in the delivery mechanism. As a result, it is the
delivery mechanism that may or may not have the public good attributes of nonexclusivity and nonrivalousness.
The public good characterization ascribed to copyrighted works
may also help to explain the congressional balancing regarding
§ 110(5) and the rights granted to stores and restaurants to publicly
perform these broadcasts, so long as space and equipment limitations
are met. 3 06 Congress implicitly chose to acknowledge that broadcasting is a public good.-A1 7 No market inefficiencies required Congress to

provide this balance in favor of the stores and restaurants. The performing-rights organizations, ASCAP and BMI, are quite efficient at
licensing such uses." 8 Congress also treated broadcasting separately
from live public performances, limiting the scope of § 110(5) to
broadcast rights only.309t
This example is not intended to analyze whether the particular
balance was appropriate to promote progress or whether the decision
merely recognized the political clout of restaurateurs and shopkeepers. Instead, the illustration suggests that where Congress and the
courts provide statutory exemptions or fair use defenses for activities
delivered under a regime of nonrivalous, nonexclusive use, the regulations will result in the lowest impact on the copyright owner. Where
the exemptions and defenses impinge on exclusively controlled activities, the copyright owner's economic and natural interests are more
highly taxed. When the copyright owner cannot control the use of
the work, congressional authorization of that conduct has only marginal impact. When Congress bars the copyright owner from exploiting
an exclusive right which she can control, however, the cost to the copyright owner is much greater. This practical reality may allow Congress and the copyright owners to agree on new rules that cost
copyright owners relatively little, but may serve to redraw the line that
the Court crossed in Sony.

306

See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).
Congress did not go so far as to declare over-the-air broadcasting a public good,
but instead provided a safe harbor for certain types of uses. See id. § 110(5), sulpra note 260
and accompanying text.
308
See Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 358.
309 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
307
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The Internet Effect

Scholars have described the Internet :"' ° as "a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communication." 31" The Internet

can facilitate an ever expanding range of information flow and entertainment activities that include passive listening and viewing of music, film, and audiovisual works, interactive gaming, instant messaging,
3 12
file sharing, collaborative authoring, and a host of other activities.
As a delivery mechanism, the Internet (or "Net") was founded as a
free, noncommercial, academic enterprise."31 Initially, an acceptable
use policy restricted the Internet to academic uses, such as research
and education.3 14 The growth increased so tremendously with the entrance of private institutions and for-profit enterprises entering the
market that by 1995, the academic uses had been overcome by individ315
ual and commercial activity.
The Internet uses digital transmission of data, which has inherent
attributes that shape both the technology and the perception of the
activity. Digital encoding allows for many types of materials-images,
words, music, and software-to be captured in the same work, so that
the conceptual separation of information from its copyrighted work
31(

"The Internet is an international network of computers and computer networks con-

nected to each other through routers using the IP protocol and sharing a common name
and address space. . . . [I]t is a method for connecting computer systems, and the phenomenon of very widespread adherence to that method." HENRY H. PERRtrr, JR., LAW AND
THE INFORMATIION SUPERHIGHWAY 6 (2d ed. 2001).
-311 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
-312 See id. at 851 for a description of online activities from 1997:
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of
communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are
constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. But, as presently
constituted, those most relevant to this case are electronic mail (e-mail),
automatic mailing list services ("mail exploders," sometimes referred to as
"listservs"), "newsgroups," "chat rooms," and the "World Wide Web." All of
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a
unique medium-known to its users as "cyberspace"-located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world,
with access to the Internet.
Id. All these activities continue to exist, augmented by the activities mentioned in the text.
31
Id. at 849-50.
It is the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called
"ARPANET," which was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if
some portions of the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET
no longer exists, it provided an example for the development of a number
of civilian networks that, eventually linking with each other, now enable
tens of millions of people to communicate with one another and to access
vast amounts of information from around the world.
Id.
314
PERRIr, sujra note 310, at 7.
315 See id.
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disappears inside the computer's memory. 1 "1 Digital storage and
transmission also allow for virtually perfect reproduction of a digital
file, with the ability to copy and transmit each file having essentially
no reproduction cost, and a transmission cost related only to access to
17
the Internet, rather than access to the digital file."
The format of the digital file results in a conflation of ideas, information, and the copyrighted expression, as the "computer file" becomes the unitary metaphor for all three attributes of the work. The
file metaphor and the unlimited copying combine to transform all
copyrighted works into public goods. Absent additional technological
innovation, computer files on the Internet are purely nonrivalous and
virtually nonexclusive. The technological and historical development
of the Internet shaped the perception that because information was
free, "copyright.. . was dead." 3 18 This perception was in keeping with
the noncommercialization required under the early public use policy
adopted for the Internet. People often believe that the Internet heralded the end of the separation between the expression and the ideas
and information embodied in the computer file. To put the final nail
in copyright's coffin, the anonymity and international scope of the
Internet has raised questions about whether legal constraints can
serve any meaningful role on the Internet. "Not only does the Net
promise perfect copies of digital originals at practically no cost, but it
also threatens to impose an almost impossible task on law enforcers:
tracing and punishing copyright violators." ' 9
1.

Three Codes of the Net-Social Code, Software Code, and Legal
Code

Assuming that social convention, physical convenience, and legal
constraints establish a copyright user's normative expectations, then
the Internet successfully undermined nearly three hundred years of
copyright. Culture, lack of legal enforcement, and technological innovation have turned the building blocks of copyright into crumbling
sand.
At the philosophical level, the tensions between the Internet
ethic and the copyright ethic are best captured in a 1996 essay by Pro32 1
fessor Peter Jaszi, who first quotes from the White Paper:
"Certain core concepts should be introduced at the elementary
school level-at least during initial instructions on computers or the
Internet, but perhaps even before such instruction. For example,
316
317

See id. at 28.

"418

LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE

319
420

Id. (footnote omitted).

See

id.
125 (1999).

See PeterJaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REv. 299 (1996).
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the concepts of property and ownership are easily explained to children because they can relate to the underlying notions of property-what is 'mine' versus what is 'not mine,' just as they do for a
32 1
jacket, a ball, or a pencil."
When I first read this passage, I realized that there was something deeply skewed ... this recommended description of intellectual property for beginners was not one I recognized. The message
is profoundly different from the ordinary Net user's understanding
of rights and duties, grounded as that understanding is in an ethic
322
of information sharing.
Jaszi articulated the rejection of the property notion of copyright
in favor of the early Internet ethic of sharing information. 23 He did
not distinguish among copyrighted expression and ideas, facts, and
unprotected information that he desired to continue sharing. Instead, copyright law itself was antagonistic to the notion of free information.3 2 4 Closely tied to the philosophical issues identified by Jaszi
are the developments of the technological tools needed to retain
some exclusiveness in the copyrighted work. Constitutional law
scholar Lawrence Lessig notes that technological adoption comes
from the ability to obtain a result and the communal will to implement that result.3 2 5 Only when both will and skills align can a new
technology be implemented.
Professor Lessig correctly anticipated that the technological
description of the early Internet was not inherent in its development,
but merely an early norm adopted by its first users.3 2 6 Despite the
overwhelming rates of present copyright infringement, he suggests
that a new dawn is breaking:
We are ... entering a time when copyright is more effectively protected than at any time since Gutenberg. The power to regulate
321

Id. at 299-300 (quoting INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK

FORCE, INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING

GROUP
322
323
324
325

ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 205 (1995)
Id. at 300.

WHITE PAPER]).

See id.
See id. at 300-01.
LESSIG, supra note 318, at 82. Lessig states:
[T]he places of cyberspace have many different "natures." These natures
are not given, they are made. They are set (in part at least) by the architectures that constitute these different spaces....
In some places there is community-that is, a set of norms that are selfenforcing within the group....
In places where community is not fully self-enforcing, norms are supplemented either by rules imposed through code or by rules recognized
through democratic procedures. These supplements may further some
normative end, but at times they are in tension with the goal of community
building.

Id.
326

[hereinafter

See id. at 125-27.
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access to and use of copyrighted material is about to be perfected.
Whatever the mavens of the mid-1990s may have thought, cyberspace is about to give holders of copyrighted property the biggest
3 27
gift of protection they have ever known.
Through encryption technology, digital rights management tools,
and authentication software, Lessig's prediction could well materialize.32H1 Nonetheless, despite the potential for such stringent technological control, copyright piracy and plagiarism remain epidemic.
Nor does Lessig's efficiency model seem as pernicious when applied
to cellular telephone service and cable television where similar technology is implemented. While Lessig is right that the Internet could
take on this persona, there has yet to be any acceptance of such an
environment. The net effect, then, is that norms, not tools, are shaping the technology.
Along with technology and social norms, the third component of
Internet regulation flows from the legal constructs that determine
questions of property rights and liability rules. Perhaps ironically or
perhaps in reaction to the failure of communal will and technology,
Congress has reacted by providing an ever increasing amount of control to the copyright owner.32) Jaszi noted the cumulative effect of the
1992 Copyright Renewal Act, which provided automatic renewal of
copyrighted works originally published under the 1909 Act, 3 :3 ° the
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,-"" and
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act._33- Others, including
this author, raised significant concerns over the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act because of both the anticircumvention provision and
the copyright term extension.3 3 3 In response to these and similar concerns, Lessig suggested that "the real question for law is not, how can
327

328

Id. at 127.
See Sean Doherty, Managing Your Digital Rights, NIcrWORK COMPUTrING, Sept. 15,

2002, at 65.
329
See Samuelson, supra note 41, at 397-98 (tracing a shift in the information-property
relationship).
330 Jaszi, supra note 320, at 301.
331
See id. at 302. Compare David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385
(1995) (discussing adoption of copyright amendments to comply with the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 11, 14(4), (Apr. 15, 1994) 33
I.L.M. 1197, 1201-02 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973 (1994)).
332
SeeJaszi, supra note 320, at 303 (referencing Senate Bill 483 and House Resolution
989, the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995).
333
See Bell, supra note 209, at 780; Garon, supra note 215, at 498 (discussing the present-day parallels between monopolization and oligopoly in the media industries); Richard
B. Graves III, Private Rights, Public Uses, and the Future of the Copyright Clause, 80 NEB. L. Rv.
64, 68 (2001). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999)
(arguing that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 is overbroad and that its provi-
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law aid in [copyright] protection? but rather, is the protection too
great?"3 34 The divergence between the legal protections and the social expectations are what drive the worst of the modern Internet
piracy rhetoric and further alienate the Internet users from the copyright owners.
2.

A False Dichotomy

The introduction to Jaszi's essay separated out the ethic of property ownership from the ethic of information sharing. 3- 5 Unfortunately, the central dichotomy, which continues to frame the Internet
debate, is fundamentally flawed. An Internet user can ethically provide information to the Internet without limitations, or with limitations that are consistent with this underlying notion of communal
sharing, and should expect such ethical conduct in return. This normative assumption regarding the role of each Internet user is a reasonable social contract. On the other hand, authors, artists, software
developers, and other copyright owners place their works into the
marketplace in an expectation that they will receive economic rewards
consistent with the price they demand. In the literary community, the
shared expectation is respect for property and commerce.
Neither of these two realities is more moral orjust than the other;
they are merely inconsistent. More specifically, the Internet ethic of
unbridled information being freely shared cannot be invoked to strip
a property holder of her property without violating property laws and
preexisting ethical norms of property rights. This central legal standard does not change merely because the property is intangible intellectual property, nor has this legal standard been challenged since the
Statute of Anne in 1709.
The free information shared by the Internet user should be that
information created by the Internet user herself. To give away another person's property without permission still begins with the theft
of that person's property. It may be popular in the eyes of the recipi33 6
ents, but it cannot be moral, just, or fair.
To further exacerbate this divide, the rhetoric has taken on an usversus-them tone, which further undermines the communal ability to
develop reasoned norms. As Professor Samuelson framed the debate,
"[i] t would oversimplify the facts-although not by much-to say that
sions are not necessary to implement U.S. obligations under the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty).
334
LESSIG, supra note 318, at 127.
335 SeeJaszi, supra note 320, at 300-01.
336
See GURNSEY, supra note 21, at 1 ("For every pirate, there are literally thousands of
users who, out of greed, ignorance or desperation, are prepared to buy material they know
is illegal. It is these individuals who create the market[,] but it is too trite to say that if their
attitude changed copyright theft would vanish.").
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the battle in Congress over the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA was a battle between Hollywood and Silicon Valley.1 3 7 In this
battle, Silicon Valley has been joined by the "free information" crowd,
which is led by the hacker community. 338

This rather incongruent

alliance joins those who wish to sell the tools of music piracy with
those who wish to validate all piracy. Until the tools are turned on the
assets of Silicon Valley, the alliance will hold. By the time Silicon Valley realizes the true nature of its allies, it may be too late for it to
recover, ultimately rendering the battle one which no one can win.
IV
BRIDGING THE GAP TO REBUILD A NORMATIVE,

ETHICAl. COPYRIGHT

The good news for copyright's future is that the divide between
the Internet citizens' anthem that information should be free and the
author's expectation that each has a right to control her own works is
not inherently unbridgeable. So long as the news of copyright's death
remains premature, there may be room for compromise, which continues to promote progress and build an ethical, robust, online community. To accomplish the reconstruction, each of the three aspects
of the Internet's regulation-the social compact, the technological
implementation, and the legal rules-must be reassessed to reinforce
the underlying principles central to the common goal of fostering a
growing, healthy marketplace of ideas founded on the rule of law and
progress in the useful arts.
A.

The New Social Pact-Towards Ethical Coexistence

To save the Internet, if not society, the Internet culture must return to valuing the marketplace of ideas rather than conceptualizing
the Internet as a lawless Wild West without boundaries. Such a
change implicates the problems of copyright piracy, but the change
must sweep more broadly to also include rampant academic plagiarism and the more than thirty-six billion dollars in illegal activity. 3 9
To accomplish this, the Internet culture of shared information
and the copyright culture of authorial and artistic integrity must be
reconciled. Fortunately, the divide is narrower than it first appears.
The task of bridging the divide has three discrete aspects: reestablishing the distinction between ideas and expression; encouraging the voluntary sharing of copyrighted works without trampling the rights of
those who do not volunteer; and educating the public so that copy"3,7
3.38
339

Samuelson, supra note 333, at 522.
See Hamilton, supra note 298, at 260-62.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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right once again plays its central balancing role of promoting progress. Each of these three tasks will be essential for establishing a
socially and economically sustainable Internet culture.
1. A Fair Use Return to the Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The first step in any plan must be to reestablish the distinction
between ideas and expression. As Professor Lessig points out, there is
nothing inherent in the code or architecture of the Internet that
makes the delivery of copyrighted content a public good. 40 Although
delivery is inherently nonrivalous, encryption technology, payment
systems, subscriptions, and other technological solutions can return
the delivery of copyrighted works to an equilibrium comparable to
that which existed prior to the advent of the Internet, but not to absolute control by the copyright owner. Copyright's inception was a response to piracy, so the problem of copying and leakage has an
inexorable link with the scope of copyright protection. Nonetheless,
the ability to create exclusive delivery of copyrighted works allows the
copyright holder to avoid treating the work as a public good.
The key to reasserting that copyrighted works are not inherently
public goods is starting with the social contract among the works'
users. While a few commentators would assert that private intellectual
property is inherently unjust or immoral, 34 1 most want to develop a
balance between the creators and consumers of intellectual property.
To accomplish this goal, systematic education, debate and dialogue
must continue between the creators and consumers of intellectual
property, which includes the audience and the creative community
(itself a primary exploiter of others' creative works). The distinction
between ideas, information, and copyrighted expression are not necessarily easy to recognize; only through ongoing dialogue can these
distinctions become meaningful. Unless the education is successful,
consumers will continue to copy whole works, believing they have a
right to copy everything in order to access the ideas contained
therein. As the Court once commented in another context, it is an
342
example of "burn[ing] down the house to roast the pig."

The lesson is simple: Take the idea from a song, book, or movie;
copy facts; research thoroughly. This is socially beneficial and entirely
consistent with copyright, as was true of the balancing test established
See LESSIG, supra note 318, at 125-27.
Cf RONALD V. BEric, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERY%' 235 (1996). Bettig explains that the primary critique of intellectual
property concentration is a species of the Marxist, "systematic critique of capitalism." Id.
As he explains, "beginning with the origins of capital ... the law of intellectual property
follows the expansionary logic of capital. The domain of private intellectual property continues to expand but not without strggles and resistance." Id.
342
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 273 (1960).
340
341
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by the Supreme Court in 1879.34" Distributing the complete works of
others is socially, artistically, and economically damaging; however,
3 44
copying the facts and ideas of others promotes progress.
The lesson dovetails well with the similar lesson that must be
taught regarding plagiarism. When one takes an idea, a fact, or a
phrase, the social contract in academic circles requires that the source
of the work receive appropriate credit.3 45 This does not require permission or increase transaction costs significantly, but it remains a
threshold requirement of U.S. academic standards. Unfortunately, as
simple as the lesson may appear, the lesson plan will take a great deal
of work. "'Copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases
belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle
and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.'"

3

4"

The difficulty in

accomplishing the lesson makes it all the more important to develop
and implement an effective educational process.
To help create a meaningful lesson plan, concepts of fair use
must be included to add gradation between all-or-nothing results of
the idea-expression dichotomy. - 4 7 Given the difficulty of line drawing
which often occurs in this context of distinguishing idea from expression,3 4

fair use provides a particularly important accommodation.

Justice Story's early formulation provides a continuing guide: "[L] ook
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of
the original work."3 " The preamble to the 1976 Copyright Act's codification of the fair use doctrine further identifies the types of uses for
which fair use is appropriate, including use "for purposes such as critiSee Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
"444 Private copying may have become normatively accepted, despite the Court's refusal
to allow librarying in Sony. Backup copies of computer programs are accepted as a necessary business practice. Whether such archival copies of entertainment works legally qualify
as fair use remains to be seen, but the practice of copying music CDs, making mixes of
favorite songs and transferring formats for playback have become ubiquitous. See
www.ripburnrespect.com (an information website housed by Gateway computers) (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
345
CHICAGO MANUAL OF ST1YLE 356 (14th ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1993) ("Almost every
serious study depends in part on works that have preceded it ....
Quoting ... [is] a very
sophisticated act, peculiar to a civilization that uses printed books, believes in evidence,
and makes a point of assigning credit or blame in a detailed, verifiable way.'" (quoting
JACQUES BARZUN & HENRY F. GRAFF, THE MODERN RESEARCHER (5th ed. 1952))).
'446 Got)s'rN, supra note 288, at 9 (quoting Justice Story).
:347
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Baker, 101 U.S. at 101.
.48
See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that a movie infringed a play although both were based on public domain true story);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that there is
no liability for movie based on trite race-based play).
.349 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
343
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cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research .... ,,35.
For nonprofit educational uses, the idea-expression dichotomy is
augmented by the Classroom Use Policy incorporated into the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act.3- 5 ' This set of guidelines provides significant additional flexibility for teachers and can serve as an
illustrative guide, representing the balance between the interests of
academics, publishers, and authors. Teachers, however, are not always aware whether or not the uses they make of copyrighted materials are consistent with these guidelines or their school's intellectual
property policies. While some teachers intentionally ignore such policies, many more are simply ignorant of them. Without knowing what
is reasonable and lawful, teachers may fail to provide students with
lawful available resources as often as they violate copyright laws. Further, the lack of understanding leads to poor education for the students in those classrooms, particularly if the teacher suggests that
copying done in class is breaking the rules, but acceptable anyway.
Such a message undermines copyright policy far more than the copying itself and if the message accompanies an underutilization of copyrighted materials, the students will also wonder why the law is so
inflexible or unjust.
Outside the academic setting, fair use serves an equally important
function. To retain respect for copyright as an important social rule,
fair use should not be construed too narrowly and courts should not
be too generous to copyright owners.3

5

2

Instead the goals of promot-

ing progress should be carefully weighed as part of the balancing test
when determining fair use.
2.

Respecting the Voluntay Sharing of Copyrighted Works

The second key to coexistence between the Internet's free-information culture and the copyright culture is to make the choice to
share one's work voluntary, rather than coerced by theft, technologi17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
See H.R. REP. No. 1476-94, at 68 (1976) (promulgating the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions, which resulted
from an agreement among the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision, the Authors League of America, Inc. and the Association of American Publishers); see also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Circular 21:
Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librarians, at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/circs/circ21.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
352
See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997) (finding copyright infringement by defendant's "Cat NOT in the Hat!" of famous
Dr. Seuss children's book "The Cat in the Hat"). In contrast, the courts are not consistently overgenerous. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002)
(denying liability for use of references to the Barbie trademark in a song).
350
1 51
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cal failure, or impotent legal systems. 353" As noted in the Napster litigation, thousands of songs have been made available for free by their
authors and copyright holders of the sound recordings. 3 5 4 The Napster district court further stated that the New Artist Program available
on Napster would not be enjoined, nor would discussion groups, chat
boards, or other uses.3 5 5 The Ninth Circuit further narrowed the
scope of the Napster injunction to allow greater file sharing of noninfringing works and, more specifically, to identify the works barred
3 56
from the system.
Under the proposal offered by the Ninth Circuit in Napster, the
potential balance between Internet culture and copyright culture is
theoretically available. Music files are available for copying and sharing so long as the copyright holders wish to share them. Every Internet musician-those that share the Net ethic-would be socially
required to make his or her songs freely available on the system. This
is not merely free information, but free copyrighted expression provided by the authorized copyright holder.
In addition to the music files posted by the copyright owners on
Napster, Morpheus, KaZaA, and other peer-to-peer networks, there
have been other, more readily embraced examples. Motion picture
short works (shorts) are not readily distributed on either broadcast or
cable television. Nonetheless, shorts provide an excellent medium for
both developing talent and exploring subject matter that does not
warrant feature film length coverage. 357 A number of Internet websites have been developed to provide a distribution mechanism for
such works and to create a community for the expansion of such filmmaking. 358 This same approach applies to most academic institutions
on the Internet. Virtually every academic institution has a website,
most with free content available for research and education, fulfilling

See WHITE PAPER, supra note 321, at 219-27.
"354 SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Defendant claims that it engages in the authorized promotion of independent artists, ninety-eight percent of whom are not represented by the record company plaintiffs.").
353

355

See id. at 922.

356

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
As stated, we place the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of
copyrighted works and files containing such works available on the Napster
system before Napster has the duty to disable access to the offending content. Napster, however, also bears the burden of policing the system within
the limits of the system.

Id.
357

JON

M.

GARON, THE INDEPENDENT FILMMAKER'S LAW AND BUSINESS GUIDE: FINANC-

ING, SHOOTING, AND DISTRIBUTING INDEPENDENT AND DIGITAL FILMS
358

Id. at 224.
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the original mission of the Internet as a robust
3 59
dissemination of academic knowledge.
Perhaps Open Source software development
ample of the proper use of the free information
ing that all rights to the software, including

environment for the

2003]

provides the best exapproach, by requirany innovations, be

transferred to future users. 360 Open Source software encourages development of computer software on a communal basis. Each improvement to the software is made available to the community for use and
further refinement by the community. It is collaborative and communal rather than competitive and commercial.3- 6' Like other authors,
the Open Source software community relies on the combination of
technological choices, legal protection through contract, and community social pressures to achieve its goals.
Without the legal recognition of its license agreement, there
would be no ability to stop a free rider from using the Open Source
software to make and sell a proprietary product that captured the best
of the Open Source expression by adding only trivial variations. Similarly, the software programmer must provide access to the community
to read, adapt, and utilize the code, and the social contract requires a
sufficient community to support the growth and development of each
project.
In all of the above examples-Open Source software, motion picture shorts, music sharing, and educational websites-the key is that
the consensual, free exchange, communal market and the commercial, fee exchange market coexist side by side. Neither model directly
-359 See, e.g., http://www.ipmall.piercelaw.edu. The Franklin Pierce Law Center IP Mall
demonstrates an ideal example of free ideas, information, and content provided for communal use by an academic institution and its faculty members. As a faculty member, I and
most of my colleagues try to assure that our work can be posted to the IP Mall without
restrictions by our publishers or others.
360
For more information on Open Source software, see FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION,
INC., GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE (1989), at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2003). The preamble to the License Agreement provides the following
explanation:
To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone to
deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you distribute copies of
the software, or if you modify it.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis
or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that you have. You
must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source code. And you
must show them these terms so they know their rights.
We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and
(2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the software.
Id.
361
Id. The contract does not restrict sales of the software, however, so that a licenseeparticipant may still package and sell the software in a form that is freely available
elsewhere.
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threatens the other. The technology, law, and social ethic can support both in harmony and, so long as the participants in each market
respect the existence of the other, the public benefits the most from
the offerings of both.
3.

The Nature of the Education

Third and perhaps most significantly, public education remains
necessary to distinguish between dichotomies inherent in the Internet
and the convergence of technologies. A new public understanding
must convey that copyrighted works are not automatically public
goods, free for everyone whether that person is a free rider or a fully
paying participant. This education must both separate and validate
the free-sharing culture of the Internet from the fee charging culture
of commercial copyright and must reinforce the importance of promoting progress through an ethos that values creative works. Each of
these underlying objectives is necessary to create a twenty-first century
copyright culture as foresighted as its eighteenth century counterpart.
These are not simple tasks. The Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights (NII Workgroup) anticipated in 1995 that
as "the convergence of computer and communications technology
brings the capability of high speed computers and communications
networks into our homes, we all have the possibility to become not
only authors and users of copyrighted works, but printers, publishers,
exhibitors and distributors as well."113 62 This convergence has con-

flated, confused, and combined the roles of copyright creators and
copyright consumers. The creator of a highly innovative website may
not be the copyright owner of the photographs, graphic images, or
sound recordings on that website. The website creator's innovative
website design, does not translate into ownership of those materials
used or limit the copyright interests of any authors whose unauthorized work appears on her website.
To respond to this confusion, public education and the copyright
industries mustjoin together to provide a pervasive program of education.3 6 This educational campaign should start with a positive tone,
supra note 321, at 219.

362

WHITE PAPER,

463

See id. at 222.
The participants in the Campaign generally agreed that education of the
public about intellectual property has a number of aspects. First, public
awareness needs to be raised about the existence of copyright law and the
protections that it provides. Second, model curricula need to be developed
so that state and local educators (and other organizations) have available to
them comprehensive material about intellectual property that could be incorporated into all levels of education. Third, the public needs quick ac-

cess to up-to-date information on intellectual property rights, and guidance
as to where the information is located.
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not just because it may be a stronger marketing approach and pedagogical message, but because the campaign should center first on the
value of copyright to each citizen as author, then to the public generally and society as a whole. , 6 4 "A point raised in the first meeting of
the [NII Workgroup] was that copyright education should not be a
series of 'thou shall nots.' Instead, education should carry a 'just say
yes' message-that works may be accessed and used, and that seeking
permission is not an insurmountable barrier. ' '3 65 Even this message
starts too late.
Every grade school student is a copyrighted author, having created essays, drawings, and innumerable objects. For an author, the
importance of copyright is much more central than for a consumer.
As the 2002 Copyright Awareness Week materials suggest, these young
authors can viscerally grasp the importance of the author's right to
control the use of one's work.3 66 Unlike the 'just say yes" message in
the NII Workgroup's version, the Copyright Awareness Week lesson
plan focuses on the participant as the author.
Everyone is now an author because federal copyright vests at fixation of the work and Internet publishing opportunities exist in every
school and the majority of homes. Every student has become a published author and most have the chance to serve as editors, publishers,
producers, programmers, or in other roles in copyright industries.
The authorship convergence caused by the 1976 Copyright Act's vesting of copyright at fixation and the invention of the Internet has fundamentally altered the authorial role for the public. Authors can be
expected to care more about their rights and responsibilities, so it is
the authors who should be educated.
Others have suggested that education is not a sufficient answer.
"Education, however valuable, does little with respect to conscious disregard of or disrespect for the law, particularly the disregard that is
fostered by a technology that makes infringing activity so easy and
painless as to leave no mark on the conscience. '3 67 The fear that respect for copyright ownership cannot be taught undervalues the interplay between the social compact, technology, and the law. Without
respect for copyright, society will increasingly devalue copyright interests and technologies will be crafted that minimize and disregard it.
On the other hand, even grudging respect for copyright concepts will
Id. at 227.
Id.
366
See Lori Hecker, Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Copyright Awareness Week: April 2228, 2002 Lesson Plan for Elementary School Classes, at http://www.law.duke.edu/copyright/
html/events/curriculummaaterials.htnl; see generally Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Copyright Kids, at http://wNv.copyrightkids.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
367
Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62
Oiito Sr. L.J. 569, 597 (2001).
364
365
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foster greater technological accommodation and improve legal
enforcement.
Education is clearly insufficient unless coupled with other tools,
but change will be iterative. Gradual increases in understanding
should be accompanied by more copyright sensitive choices regarding
the technological structure of computer code and consumer electronics. These increases will result in judicial and legislative changes that
better reflect the need to promote progress through economic and
other principles, as well as the need to protect the free flow of ideas
and information. The development of the technology and the law in
this fashion will enable educators to better articulate copyright's role
in society and each individual's role as an author.
B.

Technological Evolution

Ongoing technological change will create new opportunities for
both copyright enforcement and copyright piracy, but most changes
will benefit copyright owners. Professor Lessig correctly anticipated
that the unregulated nature of the Internet was a function of the code
being utilized and that the code could be changed to affect different
methods of regulation. 368 Because the shape of the technology is so
closely aligned with the policies adopted by the law, the two are easily
entangled. Nonetheless, a number of changes have occurred in recent years-for good and for bad-that may signal significant shifts in
the technology. In particular, digital rights management systems, the
encryption technology used to protect digital data from theft or unauthorized use, has improved even though the various standards still re39
main vulnerable to tampering.
The law directly affects the creation of software code. In an attempt to avoid classification as a contributory or vicarious copyright
infringer, 7 there have been significant changes to the peer-to-peer
software models. These technological changes reduce or eliminate
any actual file traffic or the appearance of the file name on the defendant's servers. 3 7 1 These changes, by companies such as KaZaA, cur-

rently the leader in music file swapping, result from reactions to the
368
Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatoy Standards and the Future of the
Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 762 (1999) ("Everyone now gets how the architecture of
cyberspace is, in effect, a regulator. Everyone now understands that the freedom or control that one knows in cyberspace is a function of its code.").
369
See Doherty, supra note 328, at 65; see also Darin Stewart, The Digital-Rights Debate,

2002, at 118.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2001);

ELECTRONIC MUSICIAN, July
370

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
371
See Duffy Hayes, Peering into the Future of Content Delivery, CED, April 2002, at 22.
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legal standards of copyright law. 37 2 This has created an "anti-law" paradigm where the strictures of the legal definitions have resulted in
corresponding technological growth designed to thwart traditional legal definitions. In the short run, the tactic may work, and the ability
of infringers and pirates to stay ahead of the law and digital rights
management will continue.
Systematic change, however, draws near. The use of digital information in banking 373 and health care 3 74 has placed tremendously valuable and sensitive data into the same digital format as that used for
books, songs, movies, and software. Public reaction to the theft of
hospital records or insurance documents will not be met with the disdain that the music industry has faced, and there will be strong law
enforcement reaction to such breaches. Companies involved in data
storage, transfer, and retrieval also recognize the potential legal liability for breaches of privacy and security for these sensitive computer
files. As a result, respect for data security is now part of the contrac-

See id. at 23. Cf Oversight Hearing on Piracy on Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearings before
372
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., Comm. on the House Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 19-23 (2002) (statement of Hilary Rosen, Chairman and CEO, Recording Industry
Association of America), http://www.house.gov/judiciary/81896.PDF. The activities of
KaZaA drew particular note:
An example of why it is so important to give copyright owners the ability to
defend themselves with the same technological measures used by pirates to
encourage theft came just this week when KaZaA announced that it was
giving its users "better options and more tools than ever before . . . includ[ing] a filter to help users avoid ... misnamed or incomplete files that
may have been uploaded by record labels and copyright owners trying to
frustrate file sharing." It is truly ironic that we can be stopped from trying to
protect ourselves against unlawful copying by technology, but using technology to prevent unlawful use is met with a firestorm of controversy. It is
also ironic that KaZaA can employ a filter to avoid spoofed files, but not to
filter out copyrighted works to which they have no right.
Id. at 22.
373
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The privacy regulations were promulgated
separately for the different regulator covered by the statute. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,162 (June 1, 2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 40, for the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; 12 C.F.R. § 216 for the Federal Reserve Board;
12 C.F.R. § 332 for the FDIC; and 12 C.F.R. § 573 for the OTS); cf Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,740 (May 18, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 716 for the National Credit Union Administration); Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 40,334, 40,362 (June 29, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 248 for the SEC); Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,646 (May
24, 2000) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 313 for the FTC).
374 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; OMHS Administrative Data Standards and Related Requirements,
45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2002). The security standards are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2
(2000), and the regulations first proposed at 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241 (Aug. 12, 1998).
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tual obligations of ISPs and other participants in the Internet economy in a manner that had not previously existed. 375
In addition, as convergence continues, the trend has moved beyond Hollywood's content providers and Silicon Valley's content distributors. Traditional industries such as television and computing are
moving towards this convergence as well. 376 The cable television industry has successfully fought piracy since its inception and may be in
a better position as a content delivery industry to demand effective
antipiracy implementation. Hollywood, merely a content provider,
never had the bargaining clout or contractual relations to make sufficiently strong demands.
The combination of ongoing convergence and the influence of
banking and health care are beginning to change the code and the
technological environment under which the code is created. Secure,
highly managed, constantly authenticated data will eventually become
the norm. Such data is already demanded for prototype health care
transactions. As this technology unfolds, it could pervasively change
3
the Internet's architecture.

77

The change in the technological landscape will not take place
quickly. The coming transformation of the Internet's architecture is a
paradigm shift as radical as the shift from nonprofit use to the e-commerce boom. The movement towards the Internet as a primary communications medium for business, health, and financial data will
bring with it yet another Internet culture. The Internet will replace
the paper file and the fax as the document repository and transfer
:375 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Frequently Asked Questions About
Security and Electronic Signature Standards, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/faqsec.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2003) ("8. Do security requirements apply only to the transactions
adopted under HIPAA? No. The security standard applies to individual health information that is maintained or transmitted. This is a much broader reach than the specific
transactions defined in the law."). As a result of these changes, courts no longer tolerate
many of the "as is" clauses in computer contracts. Business-to-business transactions now
require meaningful warranties and indemnities as part of the contractual bargain.
376
See Melissa Marcum, Macrovision'sLatest Solution Designed to SafeguardDigital Content,
15 EMEDIA MAG., Apr. 2002, at 12.
377 Another significant area affected by these changes will be the privacy rights of the
individuals using the Internet and participating in electronic commerce, health care or
other activities. The early code provided little privacy because of the open nature of the
Internet, however, it did provide for a lack of authentication and resulting anonymity.
The commercialization of the Internet has added authentication, eroding anonymity and
privacy. The HIPAA regulations use statutory and regulatory authorities to reassert privacy,
but there is public resistance to these regulations, and thus they seem likely to create less
statutory protection. Architectural changes through the P3P initiative provide another potential solution, but privacy-like copyright-will take the confluence of social change,
technological support, and legal infrastructure to achieve meaningful protection in the
online environment. See Lessig, supra note 368, at 762-63; see also Joel R. Reidenberg,
Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LI. 771, 787-88
(1999) (stating that "effective privacy does not end with a legislative enactment").
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mechanism. Offices will not be paperless, but most official files will be
stored in digital archives.
The change from unsecure to secure data delivery does not foreshadow the end of peer-to-peer software or other distributed computing models.
Instead, these technologies will incorporate
authentication and validity components, rendering them more commercially viable, more secure, and less avant garde. The law may also
respond to the technology, reinforcing the need to adopt these
changes. If the technology becomes conducive to adding security, the
courts will eventually treat the intentional choice to create an unsecure environment as one that satisfies the material contribution requirement of contributory infringement, creating legal liability for
failure to protect the copyright owners. 378 Like landlords and others
with legal authority, it will only be a matter of time until the relationship carries with it an affirmative duty to act, turning the failure to
3 79
provide sufficient minimum security into tortious conduct.
378
The material participation may come from failure to undertake an affirmative duty
as well as from failure to take affirmative actions. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2001).
379
Admittedly, the present Copyright Act provides federal safe harbor provisions designed to limit the reach of tort liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (limiting remedies to
injunctive relief for copyright infringement actions initiated by third parties). Nonetheless, in the event ISPs and similar companies stop assisting third parties in protecting their
copyrighted materials, privacy interest, and security of their data, Congress may withdraw
such protection and leave these companies to the mercy of the common law. Already the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides potential theories for an obligation of security:
If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his possession
otherwise than as a servant, he is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to prevent
him firom intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to
create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the third
person, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1965). Under section 318, once an ISP permits a
person to store and transmit data on its system, it must exercise reasonable care to stop
other users from intentionally harming others. Even without more strained analogy, the
provision might be applicable, assuming the choice not to provide a secure environment
was no longer reasonable.
The analogy to property law is found in section 344 of the Restatement, which
provides:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are
upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and
by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or
otherwise to protect them against it.
Id. § 344. Were cyberspace analogized to real property, such a general obligation would
dramatically alter the role of Internet providers and others.
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Again, the technology will evolve to separate the issue of data security and digital rights management from the delivery mechanism
used for the underlying data. Information may want to be free, but
technology will not serve as the vehicle of freedom. Systematic digital
rights management carries its own risks because all information, facts,
and ideas will be protected by the same technological controls that
protect the copyrighted works. Instead of technology, social norms
and legal rules will determine the prevailing degree of access for facts,
ideas, and public domain content. Only by achieving balance among
technology, social responsibility, and law will we establish a healthy
balance that can truly promote progress and provide respect for both
the author and the public.
C.

Legal Reality-Shaping, Acting, and Reacting

Each of the three influences on the normative copyright lawsocial ethics, technology, and the law-profoundly influences the
other two as it develops. The legal rules of copyright have shaped
both technology and the associated social ethics, but the law, in turn,
has been shaped by them. The law of copyright has expanded to respond to shifts in global commercial traffic 8 ° and in the cultural im38 1
portance of copyrighted works.

Law may be unique in that it is more centralized than either technology or social norms. With the stroke of a pen, the President can
sign significant policy changes into law. With a single vote, a Supreme
Court Justice can alter the outcome of a seminal case and shift the
copyright paradigm. The ProCD precedent has dramatically increased
the role of contract over copyright in many of these issues. 382 Sony
established an entire category of fair use by a 5-4 majority.3 8 3 Feist
Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 38 4 restated the minimum

requirement of originality, moving databases and other labor intensive but unoriginal materials out of copyright protection. 38 5 As a result, the architects of copyright laws must be particularly attuned to
the sociological and technological impact of the rules they create.
380
381

See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 331, arts. 11, 14(4).
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)

(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000)).
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
382
383
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
The Court specifically overturned the "'sweat of the brow'" doctrine whichjustified
upholding copyright protection for such compilations. Id. at 352 (citing Leon v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) and Jeweler's CircularPubl'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co.,
281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922) as courts that developed the doctrine).
384
385
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Changes to Limit the Law's Reach

Rather than suggesting that the law should become stronger to
protect copyright, then, it seems more appropriate that the shapers of
the law recognize the dissonance between current law and society.
This is not to suggest that Congress should automatically legitimize all
existing copyright piracy any more than the academic community
should be compelled to drop its norms against plagiarism and insistence on proper attribution for using another's material. Instead,
both Congress and the courts should return to primary principles
when reviewing the more difficult cases involving copyright and the
accompanying legal issues.
The central themes previously highlighted are those in which the
current tensions in the law affect ethical and normative conduct.
Among the more controversial topics are the practices associated with
home copying of music, fair use for reverse engineering, access to
facts and ideas embodied in technologically or contractually protected
packaging, and the role of the public domain. The law in each of
these areas highlights the tensions among public perception, the state
of the law, and optimal public benefit.
To achieve this goal, society should maintain the balance of the
idea-expression dichotomy and fair use rather than dramatically altering these fundamental constructs of the copyright regime. As the
Court itself acknowledged, the idea-expression dichotomy provides a
First Amendment basis for giving Congress nearly unlimited discretion over copyright.3 8 6 "[C]opyright's idea[-] expression dichotomy
'[strikes] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and
the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author's expression.' No author may copyright his
ideas or the facts he narrates."3' 8 7 If contract law is allowed effectively
to eliminate the dichotomy through contractual limits on access to
facts and ideas, then it will erode the First Amendment values promoted by copyright and the marketplace of ideas.
To protect the most fundamental aspects of copyright policy,
Congress must clarify the relationship between copyright and contract
law in nonnegotiated, mass market consumer transactions. Congress
should specifically preempt those contract terms inconsistent with the
limitations on copyright that exist in §§ 107-122 of the Copyright Act,
including those limitations imposed through judicial interpretation. 3 8

Congress cannot establish an appropriate balance between

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985).
Id.at 556 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,
203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
388
Seegeneraty 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2000) (codifying the statutory limitations on the
exclusive risks granted to copyright holders).
386

387
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copyright owners and the public without acknowledging the corrosive
impact of these one sided contracts on the law and on the societal
respect in which the law is held. By removing public domain and fair
use from the construct of clickwrap contracts and returning them to
the purview of copyright law, Congress can mitigate much of the current mischief.3 8 9 Congress has already recognized the social utility of
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research." ' Only through congressional control over these prepackaged term, can Congress hope to achieve its copyright balancing.
Besides the clickwrap agreements, Congress must also address the
technological encryption of computer files. Congress has exempted
some aspects of reverse engineering from the strictures of the anticircumvention provisions for technology in the statutory provisions added as Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.3 9 1 Although

the exemptions are too narrow and technical, they provide a solid
starting point for recognizing the legitimate concerns of non-copyright owners, but who are authors of other works.
Congress correctly identified reverse engineering for interoperability and security as a legitimate purpose for fair use.3, 92 Congress
needs to add an additional category of legitimate reverse engineering,
and to create an additional ground for circumvention so that it reopens access to facts, ideas, and public domain materials and provides
for fair use of copyrighted materials. By taking the legal strictures off
fair use, facts, and the public domain, the provisions of the anticircumvention statute will restore the public's rights that have been lost
to the balancing act between copyright owners and the public.
For both clickwrap contract law and encryption technology, Congress should act to maintain the longstanding idea-expression balance. This is one area where Congress must manage both law and
technology so that the ethical norms and social policy which have long
89
An example of this is the negotiations regarding digital music "streaming," also
known as Internet radio broadcasting. Recommended statutory rates were created by a
Copyright Royalty Tribunal panel only to be rejected as too high by the Librarian of Congress. The amended rates were still viewed as likely to preclude use by most small Internet
broadcasters, so negotiations began to structure a more reasonable fee based on practical
market conditions. The final agreement will later be captured as legislative amendments
to the Copyright Act. Seejon Healey, Webrcasters Closer to Royalties Deal, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 2,
2002, at C2; cf Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that although Congress has not directly addressed the issue, the Copyright Office did
not exceed its authority by excluding streaming from the statutory exemption to copyright
coverage).
"90 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 1201(a) (1) (C) (iii) (2000).
:-g" Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000) (implementing the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty)).
392
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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supported copyright can be maintained despite the advent of new
technologies and methods of conducting business.

2.

Changes to Strengthen the Law's Legitimacy

Copyright law's regulation of private copying is arguably the most
confusing and least obeyed area of copyright law for the public. Simply put, the law no longer matters. Since the Supreme Court decision
in Sony, the public has accepted the premise that it has the right to
make home copies.-t)-31 The fervor attached to home copying explains
a great deal of the current tension regarding copyright. As one
scholar has recently noted,
...private copying, again unlike traditional infringement, represents a critical form of democratic self-governance: civil disobedience. Copyright laws have become increasingly unjust, and in the
face of unjust laws, individual citizens have no choice but to disobey
and thereby force society to enforce the law in a way that makes its
394
injustice palpable.
The irony of this baseless, self-indulgent approach is that a good deal
of private copying has become lawful, despite the shift away from the
39 5
copyright owner's original interest.
This shift towards a private copying exception was introduced in
Sony and has expanded into home audio taping 39 6 and home video
taping.3 7 In Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc.,3 98 the Ninth Circuit extended consumer copying
into the realm of acceptable conduct when the copying involves temporary copies made by the consumer.3 9 9 The statutory limitations
391
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 453 (1984). The
Sony Court distinguished among the permitted time-shifting that copyright owners allowed
at the time of the case, the unauthorized time-shifting that the Court considered fair use,
and the librarying of broadcast that the Court chose not to treat as fair use.
394
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 821 (2001).
'395
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. The Court acknowledged the sea-change feared by the
copyright owners. "'Plaintiffs' greatest concern about time-shifting is with "a point of important philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment." They fear that with any
Betamax usage, "invisible boundaries" are passed: "the copyright owner has lost control
over his program."' " Id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.
Supp. 429, 467 (D.C. Cal. 1979)).
396
See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)).
-97
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (k) (2000) (providing restrictions on the ability to manufacture
analog videotape machines that block over-the-air and cable taping).
-398 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
399
See id. at 1079 ("Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or 'spaceshift,' those files that already reside on a user's hard drive. Such copying is a paradigmatic
" (citation omitted)). Although the Ninth Circuit did not
noncommercial personal use ..
address fair use, its discussion of the Napster litigation strongly supports this approach. As
the Ninth Circuit explained in Napster
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placed on software and music rental 40' do not reflect a philosophical
distinction between the differing forms of copyright, but a commonsense recognition that piracy occurs too frequently and too easily with
software and music rentals to validate the practice.
As part of an initiative to better educate the public, Congress-or
even the Copyright Office-could take the lead to marshal the disparate rules into a more cohesive statement on the personal copying
rules. Assuming Sony, Diamond, and Napsterreflect the current state of
law, as augmented by statutory exemptions, it is becoming clear that
an individual may make a copy of a song if she lawfully owns the
source of the recording. Ownership of the copy is contingent on continued ownership of the original version. There is some ambiguity
regarding whether copies of a digital file must be for temporary use
rather than permanent use, but this distinction is not commercially
relevant and should be accepted by the copyright owners.
If such a consumer use policy were adopted by the Copyright Office, Congress, or the Recording Industry Association of America,
then the rules and framework could begin to be explained. So long as
the rules themselves are unclear and ambiguous, then no educational
campaign can be expected to succeed.
Similarly, either the Copyright Office or Congress should reiterate the statutory, industry, and court-established fair use rules regarding home videotaping. With these private uses established, Congress
should next convene hearings and negotiations to establish a set of
guidelines for noncommercial personal web pages. Like the guidelines established for educational uses, clear statements regarding the
minimum fair use recognized by copyright owners and the public
would establish a set of normative practices. Again, the current chaos
and ambiguity undermine the law without adding any legal protections to copyright owners.
If consumer copy issues disappeared from the copyright debate,
the hysteria surrounding copyright policy might abate. Then the consequences of copyright piracy could be separated from the issues of
personal convenience in a manner that would allow for the reestablishment of ethical norms.
Both Diamond and Sony are inapposite because the methods of shifting in
these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the general public; the time or space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original user. In
Diamond, for example, the copyrighted music was transferred from the
user's computer hard drive to the user's portable MP3 player. So too Sony,
where "the majority of VCR purchasers ... did not distribute taped television broadcasts, but merely enjoyed them at home."
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
400
17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000) (prohibiting commercial renting of computer programs
and musical sound recordings).
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Safe Harborfor a Net Etiquette of Copying

New technologies allow for the exploration of opportunities beyond mere clarification of existing copyright policy on personal copying, and stronger preemption of copyright over mass market,
nonnegotiated contracts. There should be expansion of the Internet's tremendous opportunities for communication and media to
the greatest extent possible, so long as that expansion also enables
further progress.
One approach is to encourage the dissemination of copyrighted
works once the dissemination transaction costs exceed the works' economic value. This can be accomplished by providing a safe harbor for
noncommercial digital publication in a manner similar to that provided under § 110 of the Copyright Act. In its simplest form, Congress could bar damages (but not injunctive relief) for the copying
and public display of a United States work published at least twenty
years prior to the unauthorized use, 401 if the copying was noncommercial and if the copyright owner did not object in advance. Copyright
owners could opt out of this system simply by listing the copyrighted
work in a publicly available registry. The registry would then identify
those works for which the safe harbor would not apply. Moreover,
website operators who posted material without permission would be
obligated to respect any take down notice, whether provided by the
registry or the copyright holder.
The ability to opt out of the system would protect economically
valuable copyrights, while greatly expanding the availability of other
copyrighted works. To accommodate the formality requirements of
the Berne Convention, such a registry may need to be limited to
United States works; however, the expansion of publicly available material would still be quite significant.
This registry would also restore one aspect of the prior copyright
law, namely the requirement that the copyright owner act positively
in some manner to control the dissemination of the work. Unlike past
requirements of copyright registration or renewal, however, failure to
act would never invalidate the copyright, merely limit the initial monetary remedy. The copyright owner could quickly stop any unpermitted use of the work simply by notifying the user of the work that such
use was not permitted. Essentially, the registry reverses the presumption for permission requests-permission is automatic unless the
copyright holder objects.
401
Such a time period is arbitrary, but the number of years should be sufficiently long
enough to reduce the incentive to register a copyrighted work and remove it from the
exploitable collective.
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To illustrate the point, a novel long out of print could be posted
to the Internet by a fan at her personal website. Interest in the novel
might just generate activity, and if the publisher wished to reissue the
novel, it could add the book to the registry, notify the website owner
and begin once again to exploit the work commercially. The present
alternative is that the novel will not be available until at least ninetyfive years after publication. 4 °1 2 Because the registry would be limited

to copying, no rights would be granted to create derivative uses or to
exploit the work commercially. Thus, the model imitates the practice
of free permissions that publishers grant to noncommercial use, but
would greatly lower the transaction costs and the time required without creating any significant change in the copyright owners' economic
or management interests.

While significant debate would accompany this and similar proposals, such safe harbors would expand the public availability of works
without undermining any of the economic or other interests associated with the 1976 Copyright Act, the adoption of the Berne Convention, or any of the more recent copyright amendments. An opt out
system for older works would breathe fresh life into a body of works
that cannot be economically exploited, but which may still have some
marginal use. If the works have no such value, then the opt out system
will cause no harm; it will merely go unused. Either way, the proposal
illustrates that there are additional options for expanding public availability of copyrighted works and minimizing the loss of copyright as a
public good.
As public education continues regarding the role of copyright
and the rights of authors, other proposals can also be sought that promote progress and access. So long as the proposals do not strip copyright owners of their valuable economic and other interests, these
proposals should be encouraged.
CONCLUSION

Copyright law continues to be an integral part of the government's role in promoting progress and the useful arts. Congress, however, must take steps beyond copyright legislation to achieve this goal.
Education remains the critical component to any copyright policy intended for wide adoption and serves its normative goal of shaping
public conduct. The public will not follow rules it does not understand, nor respect laws that go generally unheeded. To accomplish
this educational goal, Congress, the courts, and the Copyright Office
must also clarify the meaning of key controversial activities such as
home taping.
402

This assumes it was published prior to January 1, 1978.
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Congress and the courts must also recognize the problematic interplay of contract law. So long as mass market consumer shrinkwrap
and clickwrap agreements can alter the normative copyright outcomes, confusion and overreaching will continue to plague intellectual property policy. Congress must preempt state law to clarify policy
statements on the importance of the idea-expression dichotomy, fair
use (including reverse engineering), and the public domain.
With few exceptions, however, economic incentives, control over
publication and dissemination of works, and other competing social
needs remain well managed by the existing congressional balance.
Technological change may reduce the public's benefit from the public good nature of broadcasting, but this does not change copyright
generally. Although selected delivery mechanisms of copyrighted
works create public goods, the works themselves are not thereby transformed into public goods.
Furthermore, treating the conceptual framework of intellectual
property as unique because of its intangible nature ignores the intangible nature of many real and personal property principles. Only
when the intangible nature becomes both nonrivalous and nonexclusive does that conceptualization affect perception and public policy.
Only when "intangible" is synonymous with "public good" does the
intangible nature of property matter.
Similarly, the natural rights conception of intellectual property
does not provide a meaningful predictive tool for assessing either the
nature of intellectual property or the social relationship between author and audience. The power to control one's work may serve this
purpose, but such control is neither necessary nor guaranteed by the
natural rights approach. Given the historical disrepute of natural
rights in the economically centered U.S. copyright regime, such discourse may actually undermine the social framework of modern copyright, making the educational imperative more difficult. The only
exception is that the right of first publication is so central to both the
natural rights and economic rights models that the discourse of this
right may well be described as inalienable and sacred. Nonetheless,
the law can respect the first publication right under a traditional economic model or under the broader constitutional mandate to promote progress.
Finally, education is imperative. The increasingly Internet-savvy
public has grown accustomed to the "public good" of unfettered copying on the Internet. Even as technology and law begin to provide
alternatives to unlimited peer-to-peer file sharing, the social damage
continues. Already, Internet culture has eroded social respect for
copyrighted works, authorial ownership, and the rule of law. Education, legal enforcement, and technological change can stem this tide.
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Overreaction to this potential problem through draconian information and security policies, however, is as dangerous as ignoring the
problem altogether. The central task, then, is to reverse Internet anarchy through a combination of education, technology and law, shaping each in concert with the others so that the copyright balance can
be restored and ownership respected, while maintaining the important role of the public domain, fair use, and reverse engineering. If
these central themes are reinforced and the goal of progress is retained, then the normative social compact regarding copyright's authors, adapters, and consumers can be maintained.
The constitutional mandate is to promote progress. The constitutional vehicle promotes authors' expression as a tool to expose the
underlying facts and ideas such expression provides to the public.
The public imperative is to balance law, technology, and normative
ethics. To achieve this balance, copyright's values must themselves be
valued.
Education is the key; only through education can progress truly
be achieved.

